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RÉSUMÉ
Dans ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons tout particulièrement sur une primitive cryp-
tographique connue sous le nom de partage de secret. Nous explorerons autant le do-
maine classique que le domaine quantique de ces primitives, couronnant notre étude
par la présentation d’un nouveau protocole de partage de secret quantique nécessitant
un nombre minimal de parts quantiques c.-à-d. une seule part quantique par participant.
L’ouverture de notre étude se fera par la présentation dans le chapitre préliminaire d’un
survol des notions mathématiques sous-jacentes à la théorie de l’information quantique
ayant pour but primaire d’établir la notation utilisée dans ce manuscrit, ainsi que la
présentation d’un précis des propriétés mathématique de l’état de Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) fréquemment utilisé dans les domaines quantiques de la cryptographie
et des jeux de la communication. Mais, comme nous l’avons mentionné plus haut, c’est
le domaine cryptographique qui restera le point focal de cette étude. Dans le second
chapitre, nous nous intéresserons à la théorie des codes correcteurs d’erreurs classiques
et quantiques qui seront à leur tour d’extrême importances lors de l’introduction de la
théorie quantique du partage de secret dans le chapitre suivant.
Dans la première partie du troisième chapitre, nous nous concentrerons sur le do-
maine classique du partage de secret en présentant un cadre théorique général portant
sur la construction de ces primitives illustrant tout au long les concepts introduits par
des exemples présentés pour leurs intérêts autant historiques que pédagogiques. Ceci
préparera le chemin pour notre exposé sur la théorie quantique du partage de secret qui
sera le focus de la seconde partie de ce même chapitre. Nous présenterons alors les
théorèmes et définitions les plus généraux connus à date portant sur la construction de
ces primitives en portant un intérêt particulier au partage quantique à seuil. Nous mon-
trerons le lien étroit entre la théorie quantique des codes correcteurs d’erreurs et celle du
partage de secret. Ce lien est si étroit que l’on considère les codes correcteurs d’erreurs
quantiques étaient de plus proches analogues aux partages de secrets quantiques que ne
leur étaient les codes de partage de secrets classiques. Finalement, nous présenterons un
de nos trois résultats parus dans [13]; un protocole sécuritaire et minimal de partage de
iv
secret quantique a seuil (les deux autres résultats dont nous traiterons pas ici portent sur
la complexité de la communication et sur la simulation classique de l’état de GHZ).
Mots clefs: Cryptographie, théorie de l’information quantique, codes correcteurs
d’erreurs, corrections d’erreurs quantiques, partage de secret classique, partage de
secrets quantiques à seuil.
ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we will focus on a cryptographic primitive known as secret sharing. We
will explore both the classical and quantum domains of such schemes culminating our
study by presenting a new protocol for sharing a quantum secret using the minimal num-
ber of possible quantum shares i.e. one single quantum share per participant. We will
start our study by presenting in the preliminary chapter, a brief mathematical survey of
quantum information theory (QIT) which has for goal primarily to establish the nota-
tion used throughout the manuscript as well as presenting a précis of the mathematical
properties of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)-state, which is used thoroughly in
cryptography and in communication games. But as we mentioned above, our main focus
will be on cryptography. In chapter two, we will pay a close attention to classical and
quantum error corrections codes (QECC) since they will become of extreme importance
when we introduce quantum secret sharing schemes in the following chapter. In the
first part of chapter three, we will focus on classical secret shearing, presenting a general
framework for such a primitive all the while illustrating the abstract concepts with exam-
ples presented both for their historical and analytical relevance. This first part (chapters
one and two) will pave the way for our exposition of the theory of Quantum Secret Shar-
ing (QSS), which will be the focus of the second part of chapter three. We will present
then the most general theorems and definitions known to date for the construction of such
primitives putting emphasis on the special case of quantum threshold schemes. We will
show how quantum error correction codes are related to QSS schemes and show how this
relation leads to a very solid correspondence to the point that QECC’s are closer ana-
logues to QSS schemes than are the classical secret sharing primitives. Finally, we will
present one of the three results we have in [13] in particular, a secure minimal quantum
threshold protocol (the other two results deal with communication complexity and the
classical simulation of the GHZ-state).
Keywords: Cryptography, quantum information theory, error correction codes,
quantum error correction, classical secret sharing, quantum secret sharing, quan-
tum threshold schemes.
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PREFACE
When the Greek words κρυpiτ o´σ ”Krypto´s” (hidden) and γρα´ϕειν ”gráphein” (to
write) are put together appropriately they give us the new word cryptography, which
in the old days was seen as the art of writing down important information in a secret
or hidden way. When the subject was put on a firm mathematical foundation by Shan-
non [60], it passed from an art to a science. The subject now rests on important axioms
or mathematical assumptions like the existence of one-way functions2 to formally prove
or disprove the security of cryptographic protocols.
Quantum cryptography, on the other hand, is the study of cryptography when the
laws of quantum mechanics are taken into account. At first glance, one would wonder
what does the world of microscopic physics have to do with computer science or any of
its branches? In science (at least the way theoretical physics has evolved in the twentieth
century), when one is looking for a link between apparently different subjects, one has
to pay close attention to the most fundamental objects in the theory. In our case, the fun-
damental entity in computer science and in cryptography in particular is information. It
is the key to unlock the mysterious connection between the physical world and the world
of computer science. Once information is viewed as a physical system, we are ready to
go beyond classical computer science and apply the framework of quantum mechanics
to information theory. One then passes from a bit of information to a qubit (i.e. to a
quantum bit). So quantum cryptography is not the quantization of the classical theory
of cryptography, but is the application of quantum principles to cryptography. As we
will see in the preliminary chapter, the quantum world differs drastically in its philoso-
phy from our "everyday" classical concepts and constitutes in itself a new paradigm à la
Thomas Kuhn (c.f. [40]).
Quantum secret sharing, as we will explore in Chapter 3, is the quantum general-
ization of classical secret sharing. Briefly speaking, those are cryptographic primitives
that involve a certain number of participants who try to reconstruct a given classical or
2Those are functions that can easily be computed but very hard (in the sense of complexity theory) to
invert.
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quantum secret in such a way that individually they cannot learn any useful (or in the
most interesting case any) information (at all) about that secret, but need the coalition
of authorized sets of players to be able to do so. The everyday example would be the
simultaneous usage of two keys to open a safe in a bank by the client and a sub-manager
or by two high-profile generals wanting to launch a missile when they are issued the
order. It is our task in the next few chapters to put on a firm mathematical ground the
theory of quantum secret sharing starting from its classical counterpart and the theories
of classical and quantum error correcting codes.
CHAPTER 1
THE QUANTUM EXPRESS
We begin our exposition with an express overview of Quantum Information Theory with
two objectives in mind, the first is to establish notation and the second to introduce the
reader to the major core results and mathematical machinery that will be extensively
used in the text.
In the classical world of information theory, the unit of information is said to be the
bit, coined for binary digit. For example, we express the length of a number by how
many bits it contains (for example: 3 has two bits corresponding to its binary expansion
11 while 17 has five bits corresponding to 10001 in its binary notation). Very often, we
will be interested in the number of bits required to achieve a certain task; for example
the number of bits that need to be communicated between two or more parties in the
computation of a given function; this is a simple example of communication complexity
(c.f. [41] for a survey of classical communication complexity and [16, 17] and [9] for
good surveys of the quantum aspects of the subject).
In the quantum world of information theory, in analogy with the classical notion of
bits, we coin the word quantum bits or qubits to describe the quantum unit of informa-
tion. To distinguish the quantum world from the classical one we use a special notation.
For example1 the "quantum" digit 3 is represented as |11〉 in its binary expansion and we
thus say that it is represented by two qubits and write |3〉 ≡ |11〉. While |17〉 would be
represented by |10001〉 and thus by five qubits.
Very briefly, after the 1920’s quantum revolution [8, 58] in our understanding of the
microcosm, it became clear that we were being exposed to new ideas that were totally
alien to our classical way of thinking. Just a few years earlier, Einstein’s 1905 special
theory of relativity (SR) [27] and his 1915 general theory of relativity (GR) [28] rev-
olutionized the way we think about space and time. In particular we had to give up
the notion that time is absolute and accept that space and time are weaved together in
1This notation is known as the Dirac notation and will be explained in the text shortly.
2an eternal or finite fabric (depending on whether the Universe is open or closed, respec-
tively) called spacetime, which in turn is itself a dynamical entity ever evolving. Einstein
taught us in SR as well that an observer may measure two different lengths, times, and
speeds depending on whether he is still or in motion; that twins who travel in space
may age differently if one of them was accelerating through spacetime, while in GR we
were taught that matter tells spacetime how to curve and in return spacetime tells matter
how to move. Thus, we see that depending on one’s reference frame, measurements are
indeed relative.
Although those notions came as a shock to the scientific community, nothing pre-
pared them for the Quantum Mechanical (QM) revolution. Just the fact of "observing"
the system under study becomes crucial in its future dynamical evolution as well as cru-
cial to what we measure. Although in small steps, we see the beginning of a pattern, ob-
servers start to enter science in different but crucial ways. From a passive observer who
(observes) "measures" with a stick a length, with a clock a time and with a speedometer
a speed, to an active observer who (in the Copenhagen interpretation of QM) collapses
the wavefunction of the system just by observing (measuring) it, and therefore the sys-
tem settles down in one of its eigenstates. What we observe (the physical trait) is the
eigenvalue of that eigenstate.
We will shortly discuss the postulates of quantum mechanics that explain those
notions, but in order to do so we first need to introduce the mathematical machinery
(i.e. the language before the poetry).
1.1 The Mathematical Machinery of Quantum Information Theory
A qubit lives inH 2 where byH 2 we mean the two-dimensional Hilbert space and
in using Paul Dirac’s bra 〈.| ket |.〉 notation we may write a general qubit as:
|Ψ〉= α|0〉+β |1〉, with |α|2+ |β |2 = 1, (1.1)
where the set {|0〉, |1〉} is called the computational basis and α, β ∈ C are called the
amplitudes.
3Notation 1.1. |α|2 = αα∗ = α∗α is the modulus of the complex number α , where α∗
denotes its complex conjugate.
In matrix form the qubit is a (2×1)-matrix i.e. a column vector. The basis therefore
are written as:
|0〉=
 1
0
 , |1〉=
 0
1
 .
The general qubit in Eq.(1.1) is then given by :
|Ψ〉= α
 1
0
+β
 0
1
 =
 α
β

LetH be a Hilbert space andH ∗ be the dual space endowed with a multiplication law
of the form
(c,ξ ) = c∗ ξ
A very useful operation on vector spaces (where the Hilbert space is just an example) is
the inner product, which we define next.
Definition 1.2. The inner product is a bilinear form (duality)
〈 · | ·〉 :H ∗⊗H → C.
The symbol ⊗ is called the Cartesian product and is studied in more detail in Nota-
tion1.10 bellow.
Definition 1.3. The dual (or complex conjugate) of the vector |ψ〉 ∈H is denoted by
〈ψ| ∈H ∗ and in forming the inner product between them we get the square of the
length of the vector. If it is properly normalized we call it a unit vector.
Let |ψ〉 be as in Eq.(1.1) with α , β ∈C, the inner product known also as the dot product
is given by:
〈ψ|ψ〉= (α∗〈0|+β ∗〈1|)(α|0〉+β |1〉) = |α|2+ |β |2 = 1,
4which is the requirement that the vector be normalized to unity and |α|2+ |β |2 = 1 ex-
presses this normalization condition. To arrive at the above condition, we have used
the distributive law of the inner product as well as the fact that |0〉 and |1〉 are mutually
orthonormal (i.e are orthogonal and of unit norm).
Definition 1.4. A quantum register (of n qubits) lives in H 2⊗H 2⊗·· ·H 2 =H ⊗n2
(we writeH 2n forH ⊗n2 ) and is of the form
|Θ〉=
2n−1
∑
i=0
αi|i〉, with
2n−1
∑
i=0
|αi|2 = 1.
We now present some important notions borrowed from linear algebra concerning
special kinds of matrices that are needed to describe the allowed operations used to ma-
nipulate qubits. A more detailed exposition on linear transformations and their relation
to matrices and more subtle properties are presented in Appendix I.
We start with the notion of a Hermitian matrix:
Definition 1.5. A matrix M : Cn→ Cn is said to be Hermitian if it satisfies:
M† = M,
where the Hermitian conjugate M† of M : Cn→ Cn is defined by
〈x|M|y〉= 〈M†x| y〉= 〈y|M†|x〉∗,
with |x〉, |y〉 arbitrary vectors in Cn.
In other words, M† is the conjugate transpose of M.
Definition 1.6. Any quantum operation is reversible, linear and preserves the norm.
Thus a quantum operation is valid if and only if it is unitary i.e. an operator V̂ satisfying
V̂ V̂ † = Î = V̂ †V̂ .
5Definition 1.7. The set of (n× n)-unitary matrices is a group called the unitary group
denoted by U(n). If in addition the matrices are unimodular i.e. of unit determinant,
then the group is called the special unitary group and is denoted by SU(n).
Notation 1.8. From now on we will adopt the notation widely spread in the computer
science literature and omit writing a "ĥat" on the quantum operator as is usually the
custom in physics.
Examples of unitary operators are:
• Negation
N =
 0 1
1 0
 . (1.2)
• Control-NOT gate
CNOT =
 I2×2 0
0 N2×2
 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 , (1.3)
where I2×2 denotes the two by two identity matrix and N2×2 the two by two nega-
tion operator introduced above.
• Hadamard Transform
H =
1√
2
 1 1
1 −1
 , (1.4)
and we explicitly display the action of the Hadamard transform on the computa-
6tional basis |0〉 and |1〉:
H|0〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) = |+〉, (1.5)
H|1〉= 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉) = |−〉, (1.6)
where {|±〉} is known as the Hadamard basis.
The action of the n-fold Hadamard transform on an n-dimensional qubit living in
a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space is given by:
Hn|x〉= 1√2n ∑y∈{0,1}n (−1)x·y|y〉,
where x · y denotes the dot product between the two vectors x · y≡ (x1y1+ x2y2+
· · ·+ xnyn) mod 2.
• Phase-Shift
Sθ =
 1 0
0 eiθ
 (1.7)
with action on the computational basis given by:
Sθ |0〉= |0〉
Sθ |1〉= eiθ |1〉.
We denote by T the operator with θ = pi2 i.e. T = Sθ=pi/2 =
 1 0
0 i
 .
• The Pauli Matrices
I =
 1 0
0 1
 , X =
 0 1
1 0
 , (1.8)
7Y =
 0 −i
i 0
 , Z =
 1 0
0 −1
 . (1.9)
We include the identity operator among the Pauli operators for completeness.
An important property that those matrices have is seen through their commutation
and anticommutation relations, respectively:
[X ,Y ] = iZ, [Y,Z] = iX , [Z,X ] = iY where [A,B] = AB−BA,
{X ,Y}= {Y,Z}= {Z,X}= 0 where {A,B}= AB+BA.
X |0〉= |1〉, X |1〉= |0〉.
Z|0〉= |0〉, Z|1〉=−|1〉.
Remark 1.9. We note that in the theory of Quantum Error Corrections (QEC)
(about which we will have more to say later) the Identity operator represents the
"occurrence" of no error, the X operator is known as a bit flip (we can see that
it takes a |0〉 to |1〉 and vise versa), the Z operator is known as a phase-flip (it
flips the phase of the qubit if it is in the 1 state), and given that Y = iXZ it is a
combination of both, a phase flip followed by a bit flip.
We see as well that the Hadamard transform (in the single qubit case) is given by:
H =
1√
2
(X +Z) (1.10)
with HXH = Z, HY H =−Y , HZH = X .
Notation 1.10. Tensor Product
A useful operation is known as the Kronecker product or the tensor product de-
noted by ⊗, which acts as follows on the general qubit |Ψ〉 = α|0〉+β |1〉 when
8tensored with another qubit |Λ〉= γ|0〉+δ |1〉:
|Ψ〉⊗ |Ψ〉=
 α
β
 ⊗
 γ
δ
 =

α
 γ
δ

β
 γ
δ

 =

αγ
αδ
βγ
βδ
 .
We note that its action is to enlarge the space. What this means physically is that
it describes the coupling of two qubits into one 2-qubit state.
This process could be extended to d-dimensions and we then talk about a qudit.
When α = 1 and β = 0, hence |Ψ〉= |0〉, we have
|0〉⊗ |0〉= |00〉=
 1
0
 ⊗
 1
0
 =

1
0
0
0
 .
When we expand the space of the system by appending (i.e. tensoring) |0 · · ·0〉 to
the right of a quantum state |Ψ〉, we call those extra dimensional |0〉’s ancillary
qubits and they represent working space.
i N .B. We will usually write |ϕ〉|ψ〉 as a shorthand for |ϕ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 and even
|00 · · ·0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
〉 for |0〉⊗ |0〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
≡ |0n〉 omitting the ⊗-symbol.
Remark 1.11. The Kronecker or tensor product has some important properties
that facilitates complex calculations.
Let A be an (m×n) matrix, B a (p×q) matrix, C an (n×r) matrix and D a (q×s)
matrix:
1. (A⊗B)(C⊗D) = (AC)⊗ (BD).
2. A⊗ (B+C) = A⊗B+A⊗C.
93. (A⊗B)† = A†⊗B†.
4. (A⊗B)−1 = A−1⊗B−1.
Now let A be an (m×m) matrix and B an (n×n) matrix:
1. Tr(A⊗B) = (Tr A)(Tr B).
2. det(A⊗B) = (det A)n(det B)m.
Where Tr and det denote respectively the trace and the determinant of the given
matrix.
We mentioned above the computational basis |0〉 and |1〉. We now introduce the
EPR-basis named after Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [29]:
Definition 1.12. EPR Basis or Bell Basis
Consider the circuit
E =CNOT (H⊗ I) = H •
(1.11)
We have:
E|00〉= 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)≡ |ϕ+〉, E|10〉= 1√
2
(|00〉− |11〉)≡ |ϕ−〉,
E|01〉= 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)≡ |ψ+〉, E|11〉= 1√
2
(|01〉− |10〉)≡ |ψ−〉.
The set {|ϕ+〉,|ϕ−〉,|ψ+〉,|ψ−〉} constitutes the Bell basis.
The circuit above thus serves to create entanglement; a property we now define.
Definition 1.13. Let {|i〉A} and {| j〉B} be fixed bases for the Hilbert spaces H A
andH B, respectively. Consider the most general state onH A⊗H B
|ψAB〉=∑
i, j
αi j|i〉A⊗| j〉B.
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If one can write the coefficients αi j = αAi αBj , then the quantum state is termed
separable and we can thus write |ψAB〉= |ψA〉⊗ |ψB〉= ∑iαAi |i〉A⊗∑ jαBj | j〉B.
Otherwise, the state is called an entangled state of which the Bell-states (bases)
represent a perfect example.
i N .B. Any Bell state can be transformed into another by applying the appro-
priate unitary transformation to the first qubit.
|ϕ+〉= I2|ϕ+〉, |ψ+〉= (N⊗ I)|ϕ+〉, |ϕ−〉= (Z⊗ I)|ϕ+〉, |ψ−〉= (ZN⊗ I)|ϕ+〉,
where by In or I⊗n we mean the n-times tensor product of the identity operator (i.e.
In ≡ I⊗ I⊗·· ·⊗ I︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
≡ In); this notation applies equally well to any operator.
Before delving into some of the important results and theorems of Quantum Informa-
tion Theory (QIT) let us step back and take a brief look at the underlying physical theory.
We give an overview of the postulates of quantum mechanics à la Nielsen and Chuang
[50]. We present the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics [8].
1.1.1 The Postulates of Quantum Mechanics
• (Postulate I) At a fixed time t0, the state of an isolated physical system is com-
pletely described by a normalized wave vector |Ψ(t0)〉 living in the Hilbert space
H .
That is to say that in quantum mechanics every physically realizable state of a
system is described by a state function Ψ that contains all the accessible physical
information.
Now suppose |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are two orthogonal physical states of the system.
Then, their linear superposition c1|ψ1〉+ c2|ψ2〉 with ci ∈ C (and proper normal-
ization) is also an allowed state of the system. This property is known as the
superposition principle. It is at the core of quantum mechanics (QM) and has no
classical counterpart. In the classical world, a bit could be either 0 or 1 but in QM
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the qubit can be in a superposition of those, i.e. in a new state that is both of them
at the same time without being neither of them individually until a measurement
is made.
• (Postulate II) To any given physical observable (i.e. a trait or property) "a" is
associated a Hermitian operator A that acts on the Hilbert space H such that
when a measurement of "a" is made on the physical system, we obtain one of the
eigenvalues λi of A. Mathematically we write an eigenvalue equation
A |λi〉= λi |λi〉. (1.12)
Let λ1 and λ2 be two eigenvalues of A and suppose the system is in a superposition
c1|λ1〉+c2|λ2〉. If a measurement of the trait "a" is made, the system undergoes an
instantaneous reduction to one of the two eigenstates |λ1〉 or |λ2〉 with probability
of occurrence
p1 =
|c1|2√
|c1|2+ |c2|2
and p2 =
|c2|2√
|c1|2+ |c2|2
respectively.
This is known in the literature as the collapse of the wavefunction, and the com-
plex coefficients ci are called the probability amplitudes.
Definition 1.14. Let "a" be a given physical observable with its unitary repre-
sentation A and a given state |ψi〉 ∈ H with probability of occurrence pi, the
expectation value of "a" is defined as
〈A〉=
N
∑
i=1
pi〈ψi|A|ψi〉, (1.13)
where N is the number of available states (to the observer) which are assumed to
be properly normalized.
• (Postulate II′) We may reformulate Postulate II above in the language of pro-
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jective measurements. We denote by {Pi}n−1i=0 , where each Pi = |i〉〈i|, the set of
quantum measurements satisfying the following properties:
If the state of the system is |ψ〉 before the act of observation, which we equivo-
cate with measurement, then the probability that outcome i occurs is given by the
expectation value of Pi:
〈ψ|P†i Pi|ψ〉= 〈ψ|i〉〈i|ψ〉= |〈ψ|i〉|2 = pi,
and the sate of the system immediately after the measurement is
Pi|ψ〉√
〈ψ|P†i Pi|ψ〉
.
The projection operators Pi satisfy the completeness relation
∑
i
P†i Pi = I. (1.14)
In the case of qubits (i.e. when n = 2), the set of possible measurements in the
computational basis is given by {P0,P1} where P0 = |0〉〈0| and P1 = |1〉〈1|.
For example, if the system was in the state |ψ〉= c1|0〉+c2|1〉, then the probability
p0 of the system to be found in the state |0〉 (i.e. to measure the outcome zero) is
given by:
〈ψ|P†0 P0|ψ〉= 〈ψ|0〉〈0|ψ〉= |c1|2.
Immediately after the measurement the system is collapsed onto
P0|ψ〉√〈ψ|P0|ψ〉 = c1|0〉√|c1|2 = eiθ |0〉,
where we have written the complex number c1 as raeiθ .
In quantum mechanics, we cannot distinguish between eiθ |0〉 and eiγ |0〉. Global
phase factors are irrelevant. This is because in the Hilbert space the entities we
are dealing with are not exactly vectors but rather objects called rays (these are
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equivalence classes of vectors that differ by multiplication by a nonzero complex
number). On the other hand, an expression like 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) is clearly different
from 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉) (i.e. relative phase factors in state superpositions are physically
relevant).
• (Postulate III) In non relativistic quantum mechanics, the time evolution of a
given closed physical system is governed by the Schrödinger equation [58]
ih¯
∂ |ψ〉
∂ t
=H |ψ〉, (1.15)
where |ψ〉 = |ψ(~x, t)〉 i.e. the wavefunction is both a function of position ~x and
time parameter t. H is the Hamiltonian of the system, a Hermitian operator whose
eigenvalues (in the matrix representation of quantum mechanics) are the possible
energy levels of the system.
In the Heisenberg picture [35] the states are time independent and evolve under
the action of unitary operators U(t) such that if the state of the system was |ψ〉
just before the evolution it is U(t)|ψ〉 immediately after. In Quantum Information
Theory there is no explicit notion of time evolution (unless we consider physical
realizations of quantum computers and we are back in the Hamiltonian formalism)
so we mimic time evolution by comparing a state before the action of a given
quantum gate and after. We read the time evolution by looking at a quantum circuit
evolving from left to right i.e. from an input state to an output state.
1.1.2 The Density Matrix
We have described above in postulate I the state of a physical system by a normalized
state vector |Ψ〉 ∈H , but what if the state of the quantum system is not completely
known? This is the general situation, and more often than not, we do not know what
|Ψ〉 is. Only in very restricted scenarios do we know the entire wave function. So we
describe our ignorance of the entire state by the density matrix formalism.
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Definition 1.15. Let {ψ j} form a normalized but not necessarily an orthogonal basis in
H N (i.e 〈ψ j|ψ j〉 = 1) and let Ω j = {p j}Nj=1 be a probability distribution with p j ≥ 0
for every j such that ∑ j p j = 1, and suppose a quantum system is in state |ψ j〉 with
probability of occurrence p j, then the density matrix for the system can be expressed as
ρ =∑
j
p j|ψ j〉〈ψ j| (1.16)
and is equivalent to the following conditions
1. tr(ρ) = 1 (i.e. ρ is of unit trace)
For assume {ek} to be an orthonormal basis ofH then
tr(ρ) =∑
k
〈ek|ρ|ek〉 = ∑
j
∑
k
〈ek|p j|ψ j〉〈ψ j|ek〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ jk
= ∑
j
p j∑
k
δ 2jk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=∑
k
pk = 1.
where δ jk is the Kronecker operator defined as:
δ jk =
 1 if j = k0 if j 6= k.
2. ρ is a positive semi-definite operator.
That is
〈ϕ|ρ|ϕ〉=∑
j
p j〈ϕ|ψ j〉〈ψ j|ϕ〉=∑
j
p j|〈ψ j|ϕ〉|2 ≥ 0
for all states ϕ〉.
A few remarks are in order about the density matrix formalism.
Remark 1.16. (Pure and Mixed States)
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¬ A physical system given by the density matrix ρ as in Equation 1.16 is known as
a mixed state while if all the p j’s except one are zero we call this a pure state i.e. the
density matrix reduces to ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
• A state ρ is pure if and only if ρ2 = ρ .
• A state ρ is pure if and only if Trρ2 = 1.
Given a mixed state ρ and a bipartite systemH =H A⊗H B:
• A state ρ is called uncorrelated if it can be written as ρ = ρA⊗ρB.
• It is called separable if it can be written as ρ = ∑i piρA,i⊗ρB,i, where 0≤ pi ≤ 1
and ∑i pi = 1 and it is called entangled if ρ does not admit such a decomposition
(c.f. definition 1.13 as well).
­ In view of the above, we note that the mean value or expectation value of an
observable A (c.f. Equation 1.13) can be written in terms of the density matrix ρ as
〈A〉= Tr(ρA). (1.17)
® The temporal evolution of the density matrix is given by the Liouville-Von Neu-
mann equation
ih¯
d
dt
ρ = [H ,ρ],
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system and [. , .] denotes the commutator i.e.
[H ,ρ] =H ρ−ρH .
Two important concepts in dealing with density matrices and composite systems are
the partial trace and the state purification that we define respectively:
Definition 1.17. Let H =H A⊗H B be a Hilbert space of a bipartite system (A and
B) and let ρ be a density operator acting on the total Hilbert spaceH .
We define the partial trace of ρ overH B as an operator that acts onH A as follows
ρA = TrBρ ≡∑
j
(I⊗〈 j|)ρ(I⊗| j〉), (1.18)
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where {| j〉} is an orthonormal basis. This defines ρA uniquely, regardless of the choice
of the orthogonal basis.
Thus ρA describes Alice’s2 partial knowledge of the full system. For example imag-
ine we do not have access to system B (the natural situation in physics is the inside of a
black hole) so we trace out that system (i.e. in the black hole context, we get ride of its
unaccessible degrees of freedom).
More often than not, the physical system will be described by a mixed state density
matrix. The following procedure defines what we call state purification, which is a
procedure to transform a given general mixed state into a pure state.
Definition 1.18. Let ρA = ∑ j p j|ψ j〉〈ψ j| be a general density matrix on Hilbert space
H A. We introduce a second Hilbert spaceH B such that3 |H A|= |H B| and a normal-
ized state vector
|Ψ〉=∑
j
√
p j|ψ j〉⊗ |ϕ j〉, (1.19)
where {|ϕ j〉} is an orthonormal basis forH B. This state vector |Ψ〉 is the purification
of ρA.
It is easy to verify that Equation (1.19) leads to the desired result. Consider the pure
density matrix ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
We look at the partial trace (c.f. Def. 1.18) of ρ over system B
TrBρ = TrB|Ψ〉〈Ψ| = ∑
i, j,k
( I⊗〈ϕi| ) √p j pk |ψ j〉 |ϕ j〉〈ψk|〈ϕk| ( I⊗|ϕi〉 )
= ∑
j
p j|ψ j〉〈ψ j|= ρA. (1.20)
One of the driving theorems in QIT is the no-cloning theorem [66] which is a pure
consequence of the linearity of quantum mechanics4.
2Alice will be properly introduced shortly.
3In general there is no direct connection between the number of pure states that enter a mixture and
the dimension of the Hilbert space.
4This would not be totally true if we consider measurements as well.
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Theorem 1.19. (Quantum No-Cloning Theorem) There does not exist any unitary op-
erator U such that
U |ψ〉|0〉= |ψ〉|ψ〉, ∀ |ψ〉 ∈H .
Proof. Assume such an operator U exists, and that |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 are two distinct and
non-orthogonal states the operator U is to copy. Then, we must have that
U |ψ〉|0〉 = |ψ〉|ψ〉,
U |ϕ〉|0〉 = |ϕ〉|ϕ〉 and we get:
〈ψ|ϕ〉 = (〈ψ|⊗ 〈0|)I(|ϕ〉⊗ |0〉)
= (〈ψ|⊗ 〈0|)U†U︸︷︷︸
I
(|ϕ〉⊗ |0〉) = (〈ψ|⊗ 〈ψ|)(|ϕ〉⊗ |ϕ〉) = |〈ψ|ϕ〉|2.
Therefore, we reach a contradiction and such a copying operator does not exist.
In the last line of the proof, we used the fact that U was a unitary operator. Another way
to prove the theorem is to use the linearity of quantum mechanics in the following way:
Let |Ψ〉= α|0〉+β |1〉 be an arbitrary quantum state that we wish to clone so that α 6= 0
and β 6= 0.
U |Ψ〉|0〉=U (α|0〉+β |1〉) |0〉 = (α|0〉+β |1〉)(α|0〉+β |1〉)
= α2|00〉+β 2|11〉+αβ |0〉|1〉+βα|1〉|0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross terms
.(1.21)
But, from the linearity of quantum mechanics we also have that:
U |Ψ〉|0〉= αU |0〉|0〉+βU |1〉|0〉= α|00〉+β |11〉. (1.22)
Comparing the two Equations (1.21) and (1.22) we see that we arrive at a contradiction
due to the extra cross term in Equ.(1.21) because α 6= 0 and β 6= 0.
Hence, such a U does not exist, and therefore an unknown arbitrary quantum state can
not be cloned.
i N .B. It is important to understand that the no cloning theorem applies to un-
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known arbitrary states like the one in Eq.(1.1). While sets of entangled states (like
those forming the Bell basis), although arbitrary in the sense that one can pick any of
the four Bell basis with equal probability, can nevertheless be cloned on account of them
being mutually orthogonal. The loophole is that the theorem does not apply if the states
to be cloned are limited to |0〉 and |1〉 (or any set of mutually orthogonal states).
We present briefly some of the most important quantum protocols that will be used
later in the text and are by now standard tools in QIT, and in doing so we introduce our
first two famous cryptographic characters, Alice and Bob, who usually want to accom-
plish some given task.
• Teleportation: [6] This is the most important quantum protocol and the most fa-
mous of them all not only for its science fictional appeal but also for its power as
to demonstrate what quantum protocols can achieve.
– Alice wants to send Bob who is far away (even on astronomical distances) an
unknown quantum state |Ψ〉 = α|0〉+β |1〉 by just sharing an EPR pair and
Local Operations and Classical Communication (LOCC).
– Say they share the state |ϕ+〉= 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
– A calculation shows that their joint state is:
|Ψ〉|ϕ+〉= 1
2
( |ϕ+〉|Ψ〉+ |ψ+〉(N|Ψ〉)+ |ϕ−〉(Z|Ψ〉)+ |ψ−〉(NZ|Ψ〉) ),
where N is the negation operator Eq.(1.2), and Z the phase-flip operator
Eq.(1.9) introduced above.
– Alice applies E† to her shares (where E† is the reverse operator of E defined
in Eq.(1.11) on page 9):
(E†⊗ I)|Ψ〉|ϕ+〉= 1
2
( |00〉|Ψ〉+ |01〉(N|Ψ〉)+ |10〉(Z|Ψ〉)+ |11〉(NZ|Ψ〉) ).
– Alice measures her qubits (and thus gets 2 classical bits of information) and
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sends her result to Bob who knows now what operator to apply to his share
of the former EPR-pair so as to reconstruct the unknown state |Ψ〉.
Conclusion: 1ebit+2bits≥ 1qubit.
where by ebit which stands for an entangled qubit, we mean an EPR-pair.
• Dense Coding: This serves to transmit 2 bits of information using only 1 qubit
and 1 ebit.
– Alice and Bob share a Bell state say |ϕ−〉.
– Alice chooses one of the Bell states.
– Alice acts on her qubit with an appropriate unitary transformation to trans-
form it into her desired Bell state.
– Alice sends Bob her qubit.
– Bob applies E† learning thus which Bell state he has, where E was defined
in Eq.(1.11) above.
Conclusion: 1ebit+1qubit ≥ 2bits.
1.1.3 The mathematics of the GHZ state
In this section we describe some of the important mathematical properties of the
GHZ state, as it is one of the pillars of our main result on quantum secret sharing and is
used extensively in the protocol we introduce in Section 3.3.2 of Chapter III.
Daniel M. Greenberger, Michael A. Horne and Anton Zeilinger introcuded the GHZ
state in [33] as a way of proving that quantum mechanics was not local realistic (c.f. as
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well Bell’s Theorem [4]). The n-party version of the GHZ state is given by
|Φn+〉=
1√
2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|00 . . .0〉+ 1√
2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|11 . . .1〉= 1√
2
|0n〉+ 1√
2
|1n〉 . (1.23)
As the most frequently used multi-party entangled state, the GHZ state has appeared
in applications such as nonlocality [46], communication complexity [18] and multi-party
cryptography [10] (as we will see in chapter 3 when we discuss quantum secret sharing).
Besides |Φn+〉 in Eq.(1.23) we define
|Φn−〉 ≡
1√
2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|00 . . .0〉− 1√
2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|11 . . .1〉= 1√
2
|0n〉− 1√
2
|1n〉 . (1.24)
We mentioned above how the Hadamard transform acts on an arbitrary vector state
H⊗n|x〉= 1√
2n
2n−1
∑
y=0
(−1)x·y|y〉. (1.25)
Now, define the parity P(x) to be
P(x)≡ x · y|y=(1,1,··· ,1) = (x1 1+ x2 1+ · · ·+ xn 1) mod 2 = x1+ x2+ · · ·+ xn mod 2.
H⊗n|Φn+〉 =
1√
2
H⊗n(|00 . . .0〉+ |11 . . .1〉)
=
1√
2
(H⊗n|00 . . .0〉+H⊗n|11 . . .1〉)
=
1√
2
(
1√
2n
2n−1
∑
y=0
(−1)0n·y|y〉+ 1√
2n
2n−1
∑
y=0
(−1)1n·y|y〉
)
=
1√
2n+1
(
2n−1
∑
y=0
|y〉+
2n−1
∑
y=0
(−1)P(y)|y〉
)
=
1√
2n+1
2n−1
∑
y=0
(
1+(−1)P(y))|y〉
)
=
1√
2n−1
2n−1
∑
y=0 s.t.
P(y)=0
|y〉. (1.26)
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Similarly, the action of the n-Hadamard transform on |Φn−〉 is given by:
H⊗n|Φn−〉=
1√
2n−1
2n−1
∑
y=0 s.t.
P(y)=1
|y〉. (1.27)
For completeness, we give the effect of the phase-shift operator introduced in Eq (1.7)
above on |Φn+〉 and |Φn−〉:
(I2k−1⊗Sθ ⊗ I2n−k) |Φn+〉=
1√
2
(
|00 . . .0〉+ eiθ |11 . . .1〉
)
, (1.28)
(Sθ1⊗·· ·⊗Sθn)|Φn+〉=(Sθ1+···+θn⊗I2n−1)|Φn+〉=
1√
2
(
|00 . . .0〉+ ei(θ1+···+θn)|11 . . .1〉
)
.
In particular we see that for θ = pi
(Spi ⊗ I2n−1)|Φn+〉= |Φn−〉. (1.29)
Combining the last few results
H⊗n(Sθ1⊗·· ·⊗Sθn)|Φn+〉 =
1√
2n+1
2n−1
∑
y=0
(
1+ ei∑θ j(−1)P(y)
)
|y〉
=

1√
2n−1 ∑P(y)=0 |y〉 if ∑θ j = kpi with k even
1√
2n−1 ∑P(y)=1 |y〉 if ∑θ j = kpi with k odd.
(1.30)
This concludes our exposé of the preliminary chapter in which we have presented
briefly the machinery of quantum information theory and the underlying postulates of
quantum mechanics together with an express overview of the mathematics of the GHZ
state.
CHAPTER 2
QUANTUM ERROR CORRECTION CODES
In this chapter, we explore the classical and quantum domains of coding theory, and
various constructions pertinent to classical and quantum error correcting codes. The
need for those topics will become apparent when we discuss quantum secret sharing
schemes, where we will see how they are closely related to quantum error corrections1.
For completeness, we have included an appendix on Linear Algebra (c.f. appendix I),
which reviews some of the nomenclature and basic facts met in chapter one and in the
subsequent sections.
2.1 From Classical Linear Codes to Quantum Error Correction
In discussing classical error correction which as we will see has a direct generaliza-
tion in the quantum world, we will need a quick review of coding theory in its simplest
form. That is in what follows unless explicitly stated we will concentrate on classical
linear codes following J. Preskill’s lecture notes on QIT [56].
Definition 2.1. A code C of length n is a set of q-nary vectors of length n, called code-
words. When q = 2 we talk about binary vectors and C becomes a binary code.
In the special case in which k bits are encoded in a binary string of length n, we
designate from among the 2n strings, a subset containing 2k strings (i.e. a k-bit message
is encoded by selecting one of those 2k-words).
Let F2 denote the field of two elements {0,1} defined by the operations in Table 2.1.
F2 is also the ring of integers modulo 2, that is Z2.
Definition 2.2. In a binary linear code the codewords form a k-dimensional closed linear
subspace C of the binary vector space Fn2, where Fn is the n-dimensional vector space
with entries in the field F.
1Mainly we will see that all quantum secret sharing schemes are quantum error correcting codes while
the converse is not true.
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Table 2.I: Addition and Multiplication Tables of the Binary Field F2.
+ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
· 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
That is, in a binary linear code, we have that the XOR function2 of two codewords
is another codeword in the subspace and therefore we say that the code is additive. In
addition we have that the code C satisfies that for any α ∈ F2 and c ∈ C, αc ∈ C.
The space C of the code is spanned by a basis of k vectors {c1,c2, ...,ck} so that an
arbitrary codeword may be expressed as a linear combination of those basis vectors
c(α1, · · · ,αk) =∑
i
αi ci,
where each αi ∈ {0,1} and addition is modulo two.
Thus we say that the vector~c of length n encodes the k-bit message α = (α1, · · · ,αk) via
the k basis vectors c1, · · · ,ck, which may be assembled in a (k×n)-matrix G.
Definition 2.3. The matrix G formed by the basis vectors ci is called the generator matrix
of the code C and is of dimension (k×n)
G =

c1
c2
...
ck
 , (2.1)
and in matrix notation:
c(α) = α G (we say that the matrix G acts on the left to encode α). (2.2)
Alternatively, the k-dimensional code subspace of Fn2 can be characterized by speci-
2Recall that the XOR function is just addition of vectors over the field F2 so in this context, we use the
XOR-function, addition modulo 2 and the ⊕ operator interchangeably.
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fying (n− k) linear constraints.
Definition 2.4. Thus we can define an (n− k)×n-matrix H such that3
H cT = 0, ∀~c ∈ C. (2.3)
H is called the parity check matrix of the code C.
From this definition and Eq.(I.6) of Appendix I we see that the rows of H are (n−k)
linearly independent vectors and therefore C is the code space of vectors orthogonal to
all those (n− k) vectors.
Definition 2.5. In this context, Orthogonality in Z2 is defined as follows: ∀ ~x,~y ∈ C
where~x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) and~y = (y1,y2, · · · ,yn) we have that:
~x ·~y =
n
∑
i=1
xiyi mod 2 = 0. (2.4)
Example 2.6. Let~c1 = (0,1,1,0,1,0,1) and~c2 = (1,1,1,0,0,1,0). Their inner product
is
~c1 ·~c2 = (0 ·1⊕1 ·1⊕1 ·1⊕0 ·0⊕1 ·0⊕0 ·1⊕1 ·0) = 2≡ 0 mod 2,
and therefore c1 and c2 are orthogonal in Z2.
Remark 2.7. We also have that the rows of G are orthogonal to those of H
H GT = 0 (2.5)
Let ~e be the n-component vector that characterizes the occurrence of an error in a
given n-bit string.
The 1’s in~e mark the locations where errors occur.
Therefore when afflicted with~e, the n-bit string~c becomes~c→~c+~e.
3When we show explicitly~c as the vector notation of the codeword c we really want to think of it as a
vector in the code space; while if we write it as simply c, we think of it in terms of matrices (in that case a
raw matrix in the code C i.e.~c = cT ).
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Definition 2.8. Some errors can be detected by applying the parity check matrix H to
the corrupted vector
H(c+ e)T = HeT (where we have used Eq.(2.3)).
HeT is known as the error syndrome.
We not in passing that when we do not explicitly show the vector arrow on a math-
ematical quantity, we have passed from the vector notation to the matrix form of the
equation.
A few remarks are in order. Let E denote the set of errors {ei} that we wish to
correct. Error recovery is possible in principal if and only if all the errors ei have distinct
error syndromes.
Only then can we flip back the bit via
c+ e→ (c+ e)+ e = c+(e+ e) = c.
(Recall that the arithmetic is done modulo two.)
We run into trouble when He1 = He2 for e1 6= e2, since there is no way to distinguish
between those errors. We can mistake e1 for e2 and vice versa
c+ e1→ (c+ e1)+ e2 = c+(e1+ e2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ C
6= c.
What really happens is that the information contents of the original codeword is altered.
We start with the codeword c and end up with another valid codeword c′ (i.e. in the code
subspace C) but different from c.
Definition 2.9. The distance d(C) of a code C is defined as the minimum distance be-
tween two distinct codewords.
In a linear code C, the Hamming weight is the number of non-zero entries of a given
codeword c ∈ C denoted by wt(c). While the Hamming distance dH is the number of
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1’s present in the codeword c which is equal to the Hamming weight of the difference.
In the case of a binary code, the hamming distance is equal to the Hamming weight of
the sum.
More formally, the distance is the minimum weight of~y such that
∃~x,~x′ ∈ C and~x+~y =~x′.
That is for a binary vector c with p 1’s we say that it has a Hamming weight wt(c) = p
and that the Hamming distance between two codewords c1 and c2 is dH(c1,c2) =wt(c1+
c2).
In example 2.6 above the wt(c1) = wt(c2) = 4 we have that the Hamming distance
between the two codewords c1 and c2 is
dH(c1,c2) = wt(c1+ c2) = wt(1,0,0,0,1,1,1) = 4.
iN .B. A single bit-flip error generates a bit string whose Hamming distance dif-
fers by 1 from the original codeword. Furthermore, if we are dealing with binary vectors,
for a code C with minimum distance d, any of those vectors is within Hamming distance
t = bd−12 c of at most one codeword.
Definition 2.10. The support of a vector c, denoted by supp(c), is the set of coordinates
of c where the corresponding entry is not 0, i.e.
supp(v) = {i : ci 6= 0}.
Back to our example 2.6 above, for the given codewords c1 and c2 we have that
supp(c1) = {2,3,5,7} while supp(c2) = {1,2,3,6}.
Finally, we are in a position to introduce the notion of classical error correcting codes.
Definition 2.11. A linear code with length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d =
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2t+1 is called an [n,k,d] code and can correct t errors or detect (without correcting) 2t
errors.
Notation 2.12. The general notation convention for a classical error correcting code is
(n,K,d) where n is the number of physical bits, K = 2k is the number of encoded bits
and d is the distance. In definition 2.11 we used the notation [n,k,d], which is usually
reserved for a Linear Error Correcting Code (LECC).
From now on, we will only consider binary codes unless explicitly stated.
We will also need the notion of the dual of a code C which is imperative for most con-
structions of classical and quantum codes.
Definition 2.13. The dual code C⊥ of a code C is the set of vectors orthogonal to all
codewords, that is
C⊥ = {v ∈ Fn2 : v · c = 0,∀ c ∈ C.}
The best way to understand the dual code C⊥ is by looking at the relationship be-
tween the check matrix H and the generator matrix G of the code C.
Recall that the (k× n) generator matrix G and the (n− k)× n parity check matrix H
satisfy
H GT = 0 for the code C. (2.6)
Taking the transpose of the above equation we get
(H GT )T = G HT = 0.
So now HT can be seen as the generator matrix, while G as the parity check matrix of
an (n− k)-dimensional code which we denoted by C⊥ and called the dual code of C.
Thus C⊥ is the orthogonal complement of C in Fn2.
Definition 2.14. A vector is self-orthogonal if it has even weight.
So it is possible for C∩C⊥ 6= /0.
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Definition 2.15. Self-dual codes: A code contains its dual if all its codewords have even
weight and are mutually orthogonal. If n = 2k, it is possible to have C = C⊥, in which
case C is said to be self-dual.
We also have the following important lemma relating a code and its dual.
Lemma 2.16. C and C⊥ are related in the following useful way:
∑
c∈C
(−1)v·c =

2k if c ∈ C⊥
0 if c /∈ C⊥.
(2.7)
The zero part of the above relation follows from the fact that given two strings c and
w of length k
∑
c∈{0,1}k
(−1)c·w = 0, w 6= 0.
If the vector~c is an encoding of α (c.f. Eq.(2.2)), we have that c = αG and we get:
∑
c∈C
(−1)v·c = ∑
c∈C
(−1)v·αG = ∑
α∈{0,1}k
(−1)α·vG = 0,∀ vG 6= 0.
Since G, the generator matrix of C is the parity check matrix for C⊥ the sum vanishes
whenever c /∈ C⊥.
Several classical bounds are known for the given n, k, d parameters forming an
[n,k,d]-error correcting code, but here we only give the Singleton bound and the Ham-
ming bound [43]:
Theorem 2.17. A classical [n,k,d] linear error correcting code satisfies the Singleton
bound, given by
d−1≤ n− k. (2.8)
Codes that satisfy the Singleton bound with equality are called Maximum Distance
Separable or MDS codes for short. Those codes have special properties among the most
29
important ones is that if C is an MDS-code so is its dual C⊥.
We also give the classical Hamming bound, which has a direct quantum analog:
Theorem 2.18. The Hamming bound for a classical linear q-nary code [n,k,d]q of
distance d satisfies the following inequality
k ≤ n− logq
 t∑
i=0
 n
i
 (q−1)i
 , (2.9)
where t = bd−12 c is the maximum number of errors that can be corrected by the given
code.
In particular for a binary error correcting code of distance d = 3, [n,k,3]2 the Ham-
ming bound simplifies to
k ≤ n− lg(n+1), (2.10)
where lg is the base-two logarithm function.
2.1.1 Notions in Quantum Error Correction Codes
In what follows, we will introduce enough nomenclature and tools to be able to
connect QECC to QSS schemes.
Classically, in the case of a binary code, the only possible type of error that can occur is
a bit flip, i.e. a 0→ 1 and vise versa. The simplest classical error correcting code that
can handle this problem is the repetition code:
0 −→ 000 ma jority←− 010
1 −→ 111 ma jority←− 101
where we use the majority function i.e. if two of the bits are 0 then we flip the non-zero
1 back to 0 (since it is more probable that one bit was erroneously flipped rather than
two). The same goes for the value 1 bit as well.
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Now, a natural question to ask is: can we use the same technique quantum mechan-
ically? Unfortunately, due to the No-Cloning theorem, we cannot do so; for we cannot
copy non-orthogonal states (i.e. completely unknown states). Furthermore, how can we
look at the quantum state in order to compute the majority (or parity)? For we know that
any measurement or information gain about a quantum system disturbs the state in a non
reversible way.
The first thing to note is that quantum mechanically, besides a bit flip, which is the
same as applying the X Pauli operator to the qubit, we can have a phase flip as well.
The latter is the same as applying the Z operator to the qubit. Furthermore, we can have
both a phase flip and bit flip happening at the same time, which is the same as applying
the Y operator to the qubit (c.f. remark 1.9 above). So, apart from taking into account
the No-Cloning theorem and the measurement problem, we have to be able to correct
for X , Z and Y -errors. Theorem 2.19 and remark 2.20 bellow illustrate the most general
single-qubit error that can occur.
As we will see subsequently, the main idea in quantum error correction is to deter-
mine which bit is different without knowing its value.
Let |0〉=
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|00 · · ·0〉 and |1〉=
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
|11 · · ·1〉 denote the encoded states or logical states. For
simplicity, we will focus on the three-qubit error correcting code with n= 3, which is the
quantum analogue of the repetition code. We note in passing that the quantum circuit in
|ψ〉 • •
|0〉  |ψ〉L = α|0〉+β |1〉
|0〉 

(2.11)
Figure 2.1: Encoding of the Quantum State Into the Logical State .
Fig. 2.1 allows us to prepare a 3-GHZ state4 as well. But in the context of QEC-codes,
the state|ψ〉L is called the logical qubit, while each individual qubit constituting it is
known as the physical qubit. Furthermore, using the same terminology as in classical
4Actually, it prepares a generalized version of the GHZ-state, unless α = β = 1√
2
.
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coding theory, we will call the set:
C = {α|000〉+β |111〉 |α,β ∈ C, |α|2+ |β |2 = 1}
the code and each member of C a codeword.
iN .B. It is important to note that the state |ψ〉 itself is not triplicated, only the
basis states are triplicated. Hence, we are in no way violating the no-cloning theorem
|ψ〉L 6= (α|0〉+β |1〉)⊗3 ,
unless α = 0 or β = 0. Now the protocol goes as follows:
(Transmission) Say Alice encodes the state |ψ〉 as shown above into |ψ〉L and sends
the logical state to Bob through a quantum channel susceptible to noise. Let p denote
the probability that a bit flip occurs due to that noisy quantum channel. We assume
that p is sufficiently small so that not many such errors occur during the transmission.
Clearly the state |ψ〉L will thus be transmitted with no error with a probability pno error =
(1− p)3 while the probability of having only one error (say on the 1st, 2nd or 3rd qubit)
is p1 error = 3p(1− p)2. On the other hand, the probabilities of having two and three
errors occurring (all bits are flipped) is given by p2 errors = 3p2(1− p) and pall f lip = p3,
respectively.
(Error Syndrome Detection and Correction) In order to detect any bit flip error,
we need to look but not see, i.e. we need to locate the error without measuring the value
of the qubit. To do so, we use the following quantum circuit (Fig. 2.12 on page 32)
which is the quantum analogue of the classical error syndrome introduced in definition
2.8.
In order to correct for errors, Bob needs to prepare ancillary qubits in the state |00〉
as seen in Fig. 2.1.1. He then applies four CNOT gates (c.f. Eq.(1.3)) with the control
bits being the encoded qubits and the target bits being his ancillary qubits.
Assuming that only bit-flip errors have occurred, let |x1x2x3〉 be a basis vector Bob has
received and let |.〉A and |.〉B be the final states of the first and second ancillary qubits
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•
α|0〉+β |1〉 • •
•
|0〉   NM
A
00 No error; 01 error on 3rd qubit
|0〉   NM B 10 1st qubit; 11 error on 2nd qubit
 
Figure 2.2: Error Syndrome Measurement.
respectively. Then the effect of the Error Syndrome circuit is to leave the final ancillary
qubits in the respective states:
|x1⊕ x2〉A and |x2⊕ x3〉B.
So we see that depending on which qubit was flipped (if any), the outcome of the
error syndrome when measured will be as displayed in Table 2.II bellow.
Just to illustrate the above discussion, let’s say Bob received the following state
|ψ〉e1 = α|010〉+β |101〉.
He applies the Error syndrome circuit (Fig.2.1.1) and thus is left with the following
global state
|ψ〉Bob = α|01011〉+β |10111〉= |ψ〉e1⊗|11〉.
Table 2.II: Error Syndrome Measurement and Bit Flip Correction.
Error syndrome Operator needed for Correction
(00) I No errors occurred
(01) X3 Error on 3rd qubit
(10) X1 Error on 1st qubit
(11) X2 Error on 2nd qubit
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Now, Bob measures the ancillary qubits and finds the classical bits {11} and thus he
knows that an error occurred on the 2nd qubit, so he applies:
X2 = (I⊗X⊗ I)(α|010〉+β |101〉) = α|000〉+β |111〉= |ψ〉L.
√
What if instead Bob receives the following state
|ψ〉e2 = α|101〉+β |010〉 ?
If he applies the error syndrome circuit, he now has the global state:
|ψ〉Bob = α|10111〉+β |01011〉= |ψ〉e2⊗|11〉.
And thus if Bob measures the ancillary qubits he ends up again with the classical bits
{11}. He will erroneously conclude that the error occurred on the 2nd-qubit and when
he applies X2 as above he ends up instead with
α|111〉+β |000〉= N|ψ〉L 6= |ψ〉L.
Thus Bob ends up with the negation of the state instead of the desired state itself.
The way out of this is to look at the probabilities of occurrence of the above states so
as to be able to recognize which state is which. For the state |ψ〉e1 the probability is
given by pe1 = p(1− p)2 since only one bit flip occurred; while that of |ψ〉e2 is given by
pe2 = p
2(1− p).
To put numbers in, if the probability of an error to occur is p = 0.1 then pe1 = 0.081
while pe2 = 0.009 i.e. pe1 = 9pe2 . Furthermore, the probability that one or two errors
to occur equals 0.972 while that of two or three errors to occur is 0.28. Therefore the
probability of N|ψ〉L to occur is about 35 times less likely than that of |ψ〉L.
What about phase flip errors?
We noted above, in discussing the Hadamard transform in Eq.(1.4) and Eq.(1.10), that
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the X and Z operators are related via:
HXH = Z and HZH = X .
Furthermore, let |±〉= 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉) (the Hadamard basis introduced in Eq.(1.5) above).
We have that the action of the Z and X operators on the Hadamard basis is given by
Z|+〉= |−〉 and Z|−〉= |+〉, (2.12)
X |+〉= |+〉 and X |−〉=−|−〉. (2.13)
This suggests that the Z operator is to the Hadamard basis what the X operator is to the
computational basis. This means that the two errors, bit flip and phase flip, are related via
the Hadamard transform and thus their correction is also related. This gives us grounds
to suggest the encoding of
|ψ〉= α|0〉+β |1〉 E˜−→ ˜|ψ〉L = α|+++〉+β |−−−〉= α|+〉+β |−〉.
|ψ〉 • • H
|0〉  H ˜|ψ〉L = α|+〉+β |−〉
|0〉  H

(2.14)
Figure 2.3: E˜: The Encoding Circuit for the Phase Shift Error.
The error syndrome quantum circuit gets a slight modification as well with the intro-
duction of single Hadamard gates on the first three quantum wires. The procedure for
error detection and correction remains identical as in the bit-flip case, with the Z operator
replacing the X operator in the previous discussion. For completness we show the circuit
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H • H
α|+〉+β |−〉 H • • H
H • H
|0〉   NM
A
00 Apply I; 01 apply Z3
|0〉   NM B 10 apply Z1; 11 apply Z2


Figure 2.4: Error Syndrome Measurement and Correction for Z-Errors.
The previous discussion applies to either a bit flip or a phase flip. To be able to correct
for both errors at once, the nine-qubit code introduced by Peter Shor [61] comes to the
rescue by using both codes at once.5 We do not explain it here because it is not the most
efficient single-error correcting code, nonetheless, it still achieves its goal. Since X and
Z error corrections are independent the code can correct one of each such as Y = iXZ.
What about correcting all single qubit errors?
Theorem 2.19. If a quantum error correcting code corrects errors A and B, it also
corrects αA+βB.
Remark 2.20. We note that the most general one qubit-error that can occur can be
written as a linear combination of the Pauli matrices i.e.
αI+βX + γY +δZ. (2.15)
i Any QECC correcting single qubit errors X, Y and Z (plus the Identity) corrects every
single-qubit error; and therefore correcting all t-qubit X, Y and Z-errors on t-qubits
(+I) corrects all t-qubits errors.
The last remark becomes more transparent if recast in the language of the the Pauli
group G n which we now define:
5We give in example 2.24 bellow the list of all the Pauli operators that enables us to determine the error
syndrome. For a detailed description of the original nine qubit code that does not employ the language of
Pauli operators c.f. [61].
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Definition 2.21. (The Pauli Group G n) We define the Pauli group G n on n qubits to be
generated by I, X, Y and Z on individual qubits. Then G n consists of all tensor products
of up to n operators I, X, Y and Z including the overall phases {±i,±1}. (The phases are
included to respect the closure property of the group, otherwise we would have tensor
products that would not be in the group.)
Properties:
• Any M ∈ G n satisfies M2 =±M.
• If M,N ∈ G n, either MN = NM or MN =−NM. That is, for every pair M and N
of the Pauli group, either they commute or anticommute.
Definition 2.22. The weight of a Pauli operator M ∈ G n is the number of non identity
tensor factors in M or, equivalently, the number of qubits on which M acts as the non-
identity operator.
For example, M = Z⊗Z⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I has weight equal to 2, while N =
I⊗ I⊗ I⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X has weight equal to 6.
iN .B. The weight-t Pauli errors form a basis for all t-qubit errors.
A few remarks are in order before we delve deeper into the machinery of QECC.
Remark 2.23. We will work in the Hadamard basis defined in Eq.(1.5) and therefore the
X operators and Z operators exchange roles, i.e. now X will correct a phase-flip error
while Z will correct a bit-flip error.
• In the classical repetition code, a correctly encoded state 000 or 111 has the prop-
erty that the first two bits have even parity as well as the second and the third.
A state with an error on the first and second bits (or second and third) will show
an odd parity. Thus, we say that a codeword (i.e. one without error) is a (+1)-
eigenvector of Z⊗Z⊗ I and a state with an error on the first and second qubits is
a (−1)-eigenstate of Z⊗Z⊗ I.
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• Similarly, for the 3-qubit phase error correcting code, a codeword has eigenvalue
of (+1) for X⊗X⊗ I whereas an eigenvalue of (−1) for X⊗X⊗ I if a phase error
occurred on the first two qubits.
– Thus measuring Z⊗Z detects bit flip (i.e. X) errors, while measuring X⊗X
detects phase flip (i.e. (Z)) errors.
– The error syndrome is formed by measuring enough operators to determine
the location of the errors.
Example 2.24. We mentioned above Shor’s nine-qubit code [61] we give here the list of
all Pauli’s operators that enable us to determine the error syndrome.
M1 = Z⊗Z⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I; M5 = I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗Z⊗Z⊗ I
M2 = I⊗Z⊗Z⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I; M6 = I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗Z⊗Z
M3 = I⊗ I⊗Z⊗Z⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I; M7 = X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I
M4 = I⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I⊗Z⊗Z⊗ I⊗ I⊗ I; M8 = I⊗ I⊗ I⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X⊗X .
The {M1, · · ·M8} form a group called the Stabilizer of the code. The group here con-
sists of all the Mi Pauli operators with special properties that we give in the following
definition. This deserves a section of its own.
2.1.2 The Stabilizer Code Formalism
Definition 2.25. Let T be a subspace of an n-qubit Hilbert space.
Define a set:
S(T ) = {M ∈ G n : M|ψ〉= |ψ〉,∀|ψ〉 ∈ T}. (2.16)
S(T ) is called the stabilizer of T with the following properties:
Properties of The Stabilizer Code
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1. S(T ) is a group: M, N ∈ S(T )⇒ MN|ψ〉 = M|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, (i.e. if M and N are
in the group so is M group operator N where the group operator here is matrix
multiplication).
2. S(T ) is an Abelian group6:
M,N ∈ S(T )⇒MN|ψ〉= |ψ〉= NM|ψ〉 ⇒ [M,N]|ψ〉= 0,∀ |ψ〉 ∈ T .
iRecall that in quantum mechanics, operators that do not commute can not be
measured simultaneously.
3. −I /∈ S(T ), since −I|ψ〉=−|ψ〉 6= |ψ〉 (i.e. has (−1) as eigenvalue).
4. From (1)+ (2)+ (3) above⇒ |S(T )| = 2r where r is the number of generators7
M1, · · · ,Mr and thus a general element can be written as Ma11 Ma22 · · ·Marr where
ai ∈ {0,1}.
Definition 2.26. Given an Abelian group S of Pauli operators, define a code space
T (S) = {|ψ〉 : M|ψ〉= |ψ〉,∀M∈ S}. Then, T (S) encodes k-logical qubits in n-physical
qubits when S has n− k generators and has dimension |T (S)|= 2n−k.
Remark 2.27. We note in passing that we refer to either S or T (S) as the stabilizer
code, where S is an Abelian subgroup of G n. Other names for the stabilizer code are:
symplectic code, or additive or additive GF(4).
Definition 2.28. Let S be a stabilizer and T (S) the corresponding quantum error cor-
recting code. We define the Normalizer
N(S) = {P ∈ G n : MP = PM,∀M ∈ S}. (2.17)
The following theorem relates the normalizer to the stabilizer and to error correcting
criteria.
Theorem 2.29. Let S be a stabilizer code with r-generators on n-qubits. Then:
6Recall that the M’s and N’s are tensor products of Pauli matrices.
7C.f. definition 2.26.
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1. dim T (S) = |T (S)|= 2n−r (where the number of encoded qubits = k = n− r).
2. Let N(S) = S⊥ = {P ∈ G n : PM = MP, ∀M ∈ S}, then S can detect errors outside
N(S)\S.
Remark 2.30. We make some important remarks on the previous theorem 2.29.
• (Remark on (1) in the theorem): Every time we add a Pauli operator, we divide
the space by two (since we have (±1)-eigenvalues). We continue on doing so till
we have exhausted all the r generators i.e. we have divided the space by 2r (c.f.
item (4) in definition (2.25) above) and therefore the dimension of the stabilizer
|T (S)|= 2n2r = 2n−r.
• (Remark on (2) in the theorem): Informally, N(S) is the set of all Pauli operators
that commute with everything in the stabilizer. We sketch a proof of (2) since it will
illustrate how the entire machinery is related to formal quantum error correction.
Proof. Suppose M ∈ S and P ∈ G n where P is an error that occurred. Therefore,
P anticommutes with all elements of S i.e. {P,M}= 0 for all M ∈ S.
We thus have that M (P|ψ〉) =−PM|ψ〉=−P|ψ〉.
⇒ P|ψ〉 is an eigenvector of M with eigenvalue {−1}.
Suppose P ∈ G n, [P,M] = 0, ∀M ∈ S ⇔ P ∈ N(S) (by definition of N(S)).
Then for all M ∈ S, M (P|ψ〉) = PM|ψ〉 = P|ψ〉 ⇒ P|ψ〉 is an eigenvector of M
with eigenvalue {+1}.
Therefore P|ψ〉 ∈ S(T ) (i.e. P|ψ〉 is a valid codeword).
We conclude that P is an undetectable error except if P|ψ〉= |ψ〉, ∀ |ψ〉 ∈ T (S)⇔
P ∈ S.
Therefore we need to mod N(S) by those P’s in S that are undetectable errors or
are even valid codewords.
(Conclusion:)
i Given the eigenvalue of an operator M ∈ S (the stabilizer), one can detect errors E
that anticommute with M ∈ S and therefore, the code T (S) detects errors that are not in
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N(S)\S.
ii Just as classical codewords vanish under the action of the parity check matrix (c.f.
definition 2.4 and Eq.(2.3)), elements of the quantum code are fixed (or stabilized) by
each stabilizer.
Definition 2.31. Let S be the stabilizer and T (S) the corresponding quantum error cor-
recting code. The distance d of T (S) is defined to be the weight (c.f. definition 2.22) of
the smallest Pauli operator M in N(S)\S.
Remark 2.32. A stabilizer code of distance d, corrects b(d−1)/2c-errors. Thus to
correct t-errors, we need the distance d = 2t+1.
In this context, we have the following definition of error syndrome.
Definition 2.33. The error syndrome (E.S.) of the stabilizer code, is the list of eigenval-
ues of the generators of S. In general, for a stabilizer code the error syndrome of F ∈ G n
is given by an r-bit binary vector~e such that:
ei =

0, if [E,F ] = 0
1, if {E,F}= 0.
(2.18)
The Syndrome(EF)=Syndrome(E)+Syndrome(F) (in binary).
If however, the Syndrome(E) =Syndrome(F)⇔ Syndrome(EF) =⊕2 0⇔ EF ∈ N(S)
(i.e. we cannot distinguish between E and F.) More precisely, E and F have the same
E.S. if and only if E†F is in N(S) and thus, E and F commute with the same set of
generators of S.
i If E†F /∈ N(S), the E.S. can distinguish between them.
Z The code corrects errors for which E†F /∈ N(S)\S for all possible pairs of error
(E,F).
i N .B. If there exist some errors in S that keep the codewords fixed, then we say
that the QECC is degenerate.
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We are finally in a position to state the most general conditions for quantum error
correction, which are given by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.34. Suppose E is a linear space of errors acting on the Hilbert spaceH and
let C be a subspace ofH . Denote the encoded basis states by {|ψi〉} ∈C, and the basis
errors by {Ea} (with all the {Ea|ψi〉}mutually orthogonal). Let Sa = {Ea|ψ1〉,Ea|ψ2〉, · · ·}
denote the measure subspaces.
Given a map Sa −→H L that takes Ea|ψi〉 7−→ |ψi〉, the following are equivalent:
1. {|ψi〉} forms a basis for a QECC correcting E (or the Span(E )).
2. 〈ψi|E†a Eb|ψ j〉= Λabδi j,
where Λab is a Hermitian matrix independent of both i and j.
3. The subspace C ofH forms a quantum error-correcting code correcting errors E
if and only if
〈ψ|E†E|ψ〉= Λ(E). (2.19)
for all E ∈ E . The function Λ(E) is independent of the state |ψ〉.
Proof. We sketch the idea behind the proof.
• (­⇐⇒¬) Diagonalize the matrix Λab by choosing a different basis {Fa} for E .
• (¬⇐⇒®) Here we use the recovery condition from the main theorem of [49].
Let U be the recovery map such that
U (E|ψ〉) = a|ψ〉|anc1〉; U (E|ϕ〉) = b|ϕ〉|anc2〉,
⇒UE (|ψ〉+ |ϕ〉) = c(|ψ〉+ |ϕ〉) |anc3〉= a|ψ〉|anc1〉+b|ϕ〉|anc2〉.
We find that 〈ψ|E†E|ψ〉= |a|2 = |b|2 = 〈ϕ|E†E|ϕ〉.
• (®⇐⇒­) Consider E = Ea±Eb; Ea± iEb. We compute 〈ψi|E†a Eb|ψi〉= Λab for
all encoding |ψ〉 while choosing for |ψ〉= |ψi〉± |ψ j〉;|ψi〉± i|ψ j〉 and we get ­.
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We comment on the meaning of the above theorem in the following remark.
Remark 2.35. We recast the equivalent conditions of the theorem using E = E†a Eb where
E now is any operator acting on 2t qubits:
• ­ is replaced by ·.
· For any orthonormal basis {|ψ〉} ∈ C,
〈ψi|E|ψ j〉= 0, (i 6= j), (2.20)
〈ψi|E|ψi〉= Λ(E), for all operators E acting on E . (2.21)
What Eq.(·.2.20) says is that in correcting errors, we will never confuse two dif-
ferent basis vectors. While Eq.(·.2.21) says that learning about the error can
not give us any information whatsoever about which of the basis states we have.
This knowledge would constitute a measurement, which in turn would collapse
the superposition of basis vectors and thus would disturb the original state. As a
consequence, this will prevent us from learning about the error in the first place
and thus we spiral down into a tautological logic. This will be a very crucial point
when we prove some of the most important theorems in quantum secret sharing.
• ® is replaced by ¸.
¸ For any properly normalized codeword |ψ〉 ∈ C, and all E acting on E
〈ψ|E|ψ〉= Λ(E). (2.22)
What Eq.(¸.2.22) says is that protecting the state against errors (or noise) is the
same as preventing the environment from extracting any information about that
state. Here one can think of the environment as representing any set that is not
allowed to look at the state; a set known as an unauthorized set in secret sharing
nomenclature.
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In terms of density matrices, for a non-degenerate code of distance d, and codeword |ψ〉,
choosing any t qubits in the block has the property that if we trace over the remaining
(n− t) qubits we obtain
ρt = Trn−t |ψ〉〈ψ|= I2t , (2.23)
That is, we get the totally mixed density matrix, which is again to say that in a
d = (t+1)-code, we cannot aquire any information about the encoded data by observing
any t-qubits in the block (ρt ∝ a constant matrix independent of the codeword).
We now give the formal definition of a quantum error correction code.
Definition 2.36. An ((n,K,d)) is a QECC encoding a K-dimensional subspace into n
physical qubits with distance d, which for Stabilizer codes is an [[n,k,d]]-quantum error
correcting code with K = 2k.
We can now recast definition 2.31 in light of theorem (2.34) and summarize the
essence of quantum error correction in the following corollary.
Definition 2.37. The distance of a QECC is defined as the minimum-weight Pauli oper-
ator P for which
〈ψi|P|ψ j〉 6= Λ(P)δi j.
Corollary 2.38. An [[n,k,d]]-QECC:
¶ of distance 2t+1 will correct t qubit errors (i.e. if Q = Q1⊗·· ·Qn where Qi :H i→
H ′i acts as a quantum channel, then Q acts as the identity on n− t qubits and may do
anything on t qubits).
· of distance d will correct (d−1)-qubit erasure errors (those are the errors that occur
at known locations, that is the quantum channel Q now produces an extra register that
tells us which t-qubits were affected).
We commented above (c.f. iN .B. after def. 2.33) on the degeneracy of a QECC.
Here we state explicitly when this degeneracy occurs.
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Definition 2.39. A QECC is degenerate for a set of linearly independent sets of errors E
if the Hermitian matrix Λab (in theorem2.34) does not have maximum rank (i.e. not all
the columns are linearly independent). Moreover, it is degenerate if it is degenerate for
E={P ∈Pn : wt(P)< t,d = 2t+1}.
i N .B. a non-degenerate code takes linearly independent errors to linearly inde-
pendent states, but this is no longer true if the code is degenerate.
Remark 2.40. In a non-degenerate stabilizer code, the distance d = min(weight) in
N(S). Otherwise, we need to look at the minimum weight in N(S)\S to get the distance
of the stabilizer code.
2.2 The Making of Quantum Codes
We briefly give some constructions of important quantum codes since both quantum
error correction and quantum secret sharing are quantum codes after all.
2.2.1 Hamming Codes and Calderbank-Shor-Stean (CSS)-Codes
Let r denote the length of the vectors in the code C. The classical linear code [n,k,d]
has a generator matrix G (c.f. Eq.2.1) of n = 2r− 1-linearly independent columns and
k = n− r-raws (encoded bits).
Example 2.41. [7,4,3]-Hamming Code
We take r = 3 here for the sake of the discussion and to simplify the constructions.
We will build a 3-Error Correcting Code (ECC). Therefore, n = 23− 1 = 7; k = n−
r = 7− 3 = 4; with d = 3 and therefore defines a [7,4,3]-code that can thus correct
t = bd−12 c= 1-error. The parity check matrix H (c.f. definition2.4) is given by:
H =

1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 , (2.24)
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While G has to satisfy HGT = 0 (i.e. we need 4-raws perpendicular to the 3-raws in H)
and thus
G =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
 , (2.25)
In general, whenever the codes are linear (which is the only case we have considered
here) we can convert from a classical code to a stabilizer code by converting:
The Parity check matrix −→ Stabilizer; that is the raws of H −→ generators of the code
space S.
Example 2.42. [7,4,3]-Hamming Code−→ [[7,1,3]]- quantum Code
For example to convert the [7,4,3]-classical code above into a quantum code S we do
the following:
• To correct one bit flip, convert the 1’s in H to−→ Z’s, and the 0’s to I in the quantum
code S.
H in Equation (2.24) is converted to:
Z Z Z Z I I I
Z Z I I Z Z I
Z I Z I Z I Z
C1. (2.26)
• To correct one phase shift error, convert the 1’s in H to−→ X’s, and the 0’s to I.
Once again, H in Equation (2.24) is converted to:
X X X X I I I
X X I I X X I
X I X I X I X
C2. (2.27)
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If we put the two codes thus formed C1 and C2 we can correct a bit flip and a phase flip
error. The quantum code we get is now
(n− k2)− raws

X X X X I I I
X X I I X X I
X I X I X I X
C2
(n− k1)− raws

Z Z Z Z I I I
Z Z I I Z Z I
Z I Z I Z I Z
C1.

[[7,1,3]]−quantum code. (2.28)
2.2.1.1 CSS-Codes
Let C1 be a classical linear code as defined in the previous section with an (n−k1)×n
-parity check matrix H1, and let C2 be a subspace of C1 with (n− k2)×n-parity check
matrix H2 (with k2 < k1).
Let the first (n− k1)-rows of H2 coincide with those of H1. Thus each word in C2 is
contained in C1 since there is an additional (k1− k2)-linearly independent rows and we
write C2 ⊂ C1.
Codewords in C2 obey the following linear constraint: The sub-code C2 defines an
equivalence relation in C1 in the following sense:
Definition 2.43. We say that u,v ∈C1 are equivalent (u≡ v) if and only if there exists a
codeword w ∈ C2 such that u = v+w.
The equivalence classes are the cosets of C2 in C1.
Next, we form a stabilizer code from those two codes as described in Example 2.42
above.
Thus if C1 is an [n,k1,d1]-code and C2 is an [n,k2,d2]-code then the CSS-code is given
by
[[n,n− (n− k1)− (n− k2),d]] = [[n,k1+ k2−n,d]], with d ≥min(d1,d2). (2.29)
In our previous Example2.42 we had [[n,k1+ k2−n,d]] = [[7,4+4−7,3]] = [[7,1,3]]-
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quantum (stabilizer) code as we mentioned above.
The following theorem gives us a basis of vector states for a well specified CSS-code.
Theorem 2.44. Let C1 and C2 be [n,k1,d1] and [n,k2,d2] classical linear codes, such
that C2 ⊂C1 and that both C1 and C⊥2 correct t-errors. Then for every coset leader u of
C1\C2 the quantum states given by
|u+C2〉= 1|C2| ∑v∈C2
|u+ v〉, (2.30)
form a basis for the staibilizer code [[n,k1− k2,d]], with d = min(d1,d2) which is able
to correct t-errors. This code is called Claderbank-Shor-Stean code of C1 over C2.
Binary CSS codes are just a subclass of the more general class of stabilizer codes.
2.2.2 Important Bounds on Quantum Codes
We mentioned above that Shor’s nine-qubit code [61] was not not the most effective
single error correcting code. So natural questions to ask are: How much better can
we do? What constraints are there on the number of encoded bits needed to correct a
given error? In this subsection we give some of the most important quantum bounds that
should shed some light on those questions.
2.2.2.1 The Quantum Hamming Bound
Consider an [[n,k,d]]-quantum code with distance d = 2t + 1. Suppose this code is
non degenerate (c.f. definition 2.39).
On any given qubit, there are three possible linearly independent errors (X ,Y or Z).
Thus there are
3l
 n
l
 = 3l n!
l!(n− l)! ,
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distinct errors in l-qubits out of a block of n-qubits. the total number of ways to have at
most t-errors in those n-qubits is given by:
t
∑
l=0
3l
 n
l
 .
If there are k-encoded qubits , then there are 2k-linearly independent codewords while
there are 2n-orthogonal states in a Hilbert space describing n-qubits. The Hilbert space
spanning those 2n-states has to be large enough to encompass the total number of possi-
ble errors of weight up to t taking into account the 2k- linearly independent codewords.
So we arrive at:
2k
t
∑
l=0
3l
 n
l
≤ 2n.
Rearranging terms we finally get the Quantum Hamming Bound
t
∑
l=0
3l
 n
l
≤ 2n−k. (2.31)
For a code encoding a single qubit k = 1 and correcting a single error t = 1 we get
from the Hamming bound 1+ 3n ≤ 2n−1 which is valid for n ≥ 5. Saturation of the
bound gives us a [[5,1,3]]-quantum code correcting a single error and of distance d = 3.
This reduction in the number of qubits required for QECC was due to DiVencenzo and
Shor [26]. From the above bound n = 5 is the optimal number to correct all types of
single-qubit errors.
2.2.2.2 The No-Cloning Bound and the Quantum Singleton Bound
We focussed in the previous paragraph on non-degenerate codes and derived the
quantum Hamming bound and found that n = 5 was saturating this bound. Now what
if non-degenerate codes were able to give us a lower bound on n say n = 4. If this was
the case we would be able to have a [[4,1,3]]-quantum code correcting a single bit error.
But a code that can correct t errors at arbitrary location can correct 2t-errors at known
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locations (c.f. Corollary 2.38). Then this would allow us to use this [[4,1,3]]-QECC
to encode a single qubit into one block of four and split this block into two sub-blocks
each containing two qubits. If we append |00〉 to each of the sub-blocks, the original
block would have been replicated twice. Moreover since we can correct 2t errors whose
location we know, we can thus use this procedure to correct for errors in each block and
recover the original quantum state. Thus we would end up with two faithful copies of
the original quantum state which would clearly violate the no-cloning theorem 1.19.
Generalizing the above reasoning, for an [[n,k,d]]- quantum error code correcting
d−1 = t-errors we get the no-cloning bound
n > 2(d−1) (2.32)
The factor of 2 is reminiscent of not violating the no-cloning theorem. Therefore whether
the code is degenerate or not, n = 5 is the best we can do.
An improvement on the no-cloning bound Eq.(2.32) above is the quantum singleton
bound which we give without proof (c.f. Preskill for a detailed proof based on the
subadditivity of the Von Neumann entropy)
n− k ≥ 2(d−1). (2.33)
2.3 Summary
We gave a quick yet thorough review of classical and quantum error correcting codes.
We saw that quantum and classical codes are in many respects similar. In classical coding
theory, logical codes of k-bits are encoded into codewords of n> k-bits. Those n-bits are
chosen among a larger set of 2n-possible words of n-bits in such a way that an alteration
to at most t-bits of those (due to noise or any source of error) can be recovered. Thus
this specific set of codewords form an [n,k, t]-code which encodes k-bits into n-bits and
corrects at most t-bits. The repetition code is the simplest example of such codes, where
we have k = 1, n = 3 and t = 1 giving us a [3,1,1]-classical code. On the other hand,
in quantum error corrections, the main problem is to find a suitable set of 2k-quantum
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codewords of n-qubits such that quantum information can be protected from interactions
with the environment which usually leads to the corruption of the quantum data. Those
quantum-codewords form a [[n,k,d]]-quantum error correcting code which corrects up
to d−1 errors where d is the distance of the code.
CHAPTER 3
FROM CLASSICAL TO QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
In this chapter, we will explore a domain of cryptography that is (in my opinion) one of
the most elegant subjects in this discipline, namely secret sharing, which was introduced
independently in 1979 by Blakley [7] and Shamir [59] as a way to solve the problem of
secure key distribution among several parties. The beauty of this branch of cryptography
emanates not only from its practical use, but especially from relating diverse subjects
from different branches of mathematics and computer science, from graph theory to
coding theory and error correction codes, from geometric constructions to algebraic ones
and beyond.
3.1 The Classical World
In this section we start by exploring the classical domain of secret sharing and in
doing so we will need to review some known concepts, definitions and various construc-
tions pertinent to classical secret sharing protocols. These constructions will pave the
way for the quantum domain, which as we will see is quite different from its classical
counterpart and will be the subject of the next section.
3.1.1 Classical Secret Sharing
Imagine a bank manager who is going abroad and would like to delegate his secret
combination (to the vault) to his sub managers (say there are n of them), in such a way
that not trusting individually anyone in particular he would like that at least k of them
(with k ≤ n) be present at any given time when the secret combination is to be used.
Those k sub-managers have to cooperate all together to reconstruct the secret while any
k−1 of them get absolutely no information about the secret. This is known as a (k,n)-
threshold scheme, which is an example of the more general problem known as secret
sharing. It was first solved in 1979 by Blakley [7] and independently by Shamir [59],
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who showed how to reconstruct the secret in what became known as (k,n)-threshold
secret sharing schemes, i.e. k shares are needed out of n to reconstruct the secret while
k−1 shares get no information at all about the secret.
Before delving into formal constructions and theorems, let us look at the simplest
secret (splitting) scenario.
Problem 3.1. Secret Splitting1: a two-party case
Consider the case where we have a message M, represented as an integer2, that we
would like to split between two people, say Alice and Bob in such a way that neither of
them alone can reconstruct the message M, but together they can.
Solution
Give Alice a random uniformly picked integer r and give Bob M− r.
To reconstruct the secret, Alice and Bob simply add their pieces together.
N .B. One has to do all the arithmetics modulo a large integer p where we assume that
the integers are uniformly picked (i.e. with a probability of 1p each).
Problem 3.2. Secret Splitting: a generalization
We consider the generalization of the previous problem (3.1) where we now want to split
the secret S among n participants, in such a way that all of them collaborate to recon-
struct S, while any coalition of n−1 participants get no useful information whatsoever
about the secret.
Solution
Choose n−1 random integers r1,r2, · · · ,rn−1 and give them to n−1 of the participants,
while give the remaining person S−∑n−1i=1 ri(mod p).
Clearly, to reconstruct the secret S all of the n-participants need to collaborate; they just
need to add up their shares, while n−1 of them will get no information at all about the
secret given that each share is randomly picked, the nth participant will be left with a
random number as well.
1Secret splitting refers to an (n,n) threshold scheme, where absolutely all shares are needed to recon-
struct the secret.
2All the arithmetic is modular.
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i N .B. The previous two problems are special cases of a (k,n)-threshold scheme
with k = n i.e. an (n,n)-threshold scheme.
We move on now to Shamir and Blakley’s solutions to the (k,n) threshold scheme prob-
lem.
Example 3.3. Blakely and Shamir in: Tales from the Cryptogram
We are back again with the bank manager and his crypt (or vault) and we would like to
examine how Blakley and Shamir resolved the given puzzle of secret reconstruction. We
will present Shamir’s solution first since it is more transparent than Blakley’s approach.
The latter will be more appreciated once we have seen Shamir’s at work.
• Shamir’s Approach [59]
In our tail from the crypt, the manager wants to share his secret combination to
the crypt with specific subsets of his employees. In formal secret sharing scenarios
the manager is known as the dealer D and the set of employees is known as the
set of players or participantsP . The protocol goes as follows:
– (Share construction) The dealerD splits the secret S into shares Si (or shad-
ows as they are also known) by picking randomly a k−1-degree polynomial
where all arithmetics is done in3 GF(p).
q(x)≡ a0+a1x+a2x2+ · · ·ak−1xk−1 mod p,
where a0 = S. Now, set y1 = q(1),y2 = q(2), · · · ,yn = q(n).
Here yi ≡ q(i) mod p is understood4.
– (Share Distribution) The dealer D gives out the pair (i,yi) to each player
Pi.
N .B. The prime p is known to all but the polynomial q(x) is kept secret.
– (Secret Reconstruction) Now, suppose k participants get together and share
their pairs in order to recover the secret S. This can always be done because
3We take p to be a large prime number so that GF(p)' Zp.
4 What we have done here, is to pick distinct integers x1, · · · ,xn all mod p, that without loss of gener-
ality we have set to 1,2, · · · ,n as a reasonable choice.
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there exists a unique (k− 1)-degree polynomial going through any given k
points. We present two elegant efficient ways for doing this:
∗ (Linear System Approach)
Given those k points (x1,y1), · · · ,(xk,yk), we want to reconstruct the
k−1-degree polynomial q(x), keeping in mind that S = a0 and
yi ≡ a0+a1xi+ · · ·+akxk−1i mod p.
Thus, we have a linear system of k-equations that we can cast in matrix
form
1 x1 · · · xk−11
1 x2 · · · xk−12
...
... . . .
...
1 xk · · · xk−1k


a0
a1
...
ak
≡

y1
y2
...
yk

This matrix (call it V ) is known as a Vandermonde matrix.
It has a unique solution provided its determinant is non-zero (mod p).
One can show that the determinant is given by
detV = ∏
1≤i< j≤k
(xi− x j)
We see that the determinant is zero when two of the xi’s coincide
(modulo p). Thus the system has a unique solution as long as they are
distinct (here the primality of p plays a major role to ensure this).
∗ (Lagrange Interpolation Method)
An alternative approach is to use the Lagrange interpolation method to
reconstruct the polynomial q(x) (and hence the secret message) given
that we know k of its values (xk,yk).
Recall that the coefficients a1, · · · ,ak−1 are randomly chosen from a
uniform distribution over the integers in the range [0, p).
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Let li(x)≡
k
∏
j=1, j 6=i
x− x j
xi− x j mod p. (3.1)
The Lagrange interpolation polynomial is defined as
P(x) =
k
∑
i=1
yili(x), (3.2)
satisfying the requirement that P(xl) := yl ∀ 1≤ l ≤ k.
For example when x = x1 we get
P(x1) = y1l1(x1)+ y2l2(x1)+ · · · ≡ y1 ·1+ y2 ·0+ ...≡ y1 mod p.
To reconstruct the secret message all one has to do is to evaluate
P(x)|x=0, and thus we get
S = P(0)≡
k
∑
i=1
yi
k
∏
j=1, j 6=i
−x j
xi− x j mod p. (3.3)
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Figure 3.1: Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme.
i N .B. As can be seen in fig.(3.1), even with the lack of a single share
(point), the secret can still be any equiprobable value in [0, p).
• Blakley’s Approach [7]
The idea behind Blakley’s (k,n) threshold secret sharing scheme (also known as a
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vector scheme) is to use hyperplane geometry to hide and reconstruct the secret.
In this scenario, the secret is a point in k-dimensional hyperspace (over a finite
field) and the n shares are affine hyperplanes that pass through this point (i.e.
each share is the equation of a (k− 1)-dimensional hyperplane that includes the
point). To reconstruct the secret, k players come together to solve the system of
equations (i.e. the intersection of those hyperplanes is the desired secret (point)).
– (Share construction) The dealer D picks a secret S = s0 that he will want
coalitions of k participants to be able to recover while any k−1 of them get
no information about it.
- D chooses at random a large prime p > s0 and integers s1,s2, · · · ,sk−1
(where again all arithmetic is done modulo p)5, and thus defines a point
Q = (s0,s1,s2 · · · ,sk−1) in k-dimensional space.
- The secret will be taken to be the first coordinate of Q.
- Now, the dealer D chooses at random (k−1)-independent coefficients
a(i)0 ,a
(i)
1 , · · · ,a(i)k−2( mod p), f or each 1≤ i≤ n, while setting
y(i) = sk−1−
k−2
∑
j=0
a(i)j s j mod p.
– (Share Distribution) The dealer D gives out securely the following hyper-
plane (labeled by i) to the corresponding participant Pi
xk−1 =
k−2
∑
j=0
a(i)j x j + y
(i) mod p,
where the yi’s, 0≤ i≤ k−1, are free variables.
– (Secret Reconstruction) To reconstruct the secret (i.e. to find the given point
Q), k of the Pi’s (in our scenario sub-managers) pool together their shares.
These shares represent k distinct hyperplane equations and thus a linear sys-
5We work again in GF(p).
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tem of equations that we cast in matrix form:
a(1)0 a
(1)
1 · · · −1
a(2)0 a
(2)
1 · · · −1
...
... . . .
...
a(k)0 a
(k)
1 · · · −1


s0
s1
...
sk−1
≡

−y(1)
−y(2)
...
−y(k)

As long as the determinant of this matrix is non zero, (i.e. as long as the
columns a linearly independent or non-zero) the matrix can be inverted (all
done modulo p) and thus recover the point Q and in particular its first coor-
dinate s0 = S which is our sought out secret.
As in Shamir’s scheme, if less than k participants try to recover the secret, even
k−1 of them, they will be left out with an equiprobable possibility of intersection
points. Since there would be a hyperplane equation missing that is needed to
determine uniquely the given point Q and thus in our tail, the k−1 sub-managers
would get no information at all about the secret s0.
We start by exploring some formal definitions of the classical domain of secret shar-
ing schemes, in particular to introduce nomenclature and important notions that carry
over to the quantum realm. We strongly emphasize the fact that classical constructions
do not carry over automatically to the construction of quantum secret sharing schemes.
The quantum world imposes strong conditions on the allowed schemes as we will discuss
shortly.
3.1.2 Formal Definitions and Constructions
We start by defining formally which sets and subsets of players are allowed to recon-
struct the secret and which are not.
Let P = {Pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be the set of players; and S the share set (i.e. the set of all
possible shares). To avoid confusion with the set of possible shares, and for historical
reasons, we will useK to denote the set of all possible secrets, because originally secret
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sharing schemes where introduced to solve the problem of securely sharing secret keys
Ki.
Definition 3.4. A set Γ of subsets ofP is called monotone if
(
A ∈ Γ and A⊆ A′) ⇒ A′ ∈ Γ.
That is, Γ is closed upward.
Definition 3.5. An access structure Γ, where Γ is monotone, is a set of subsets of P ,
which is to say that Γ ⊆ 2P . Elements of Γ are those subsets of players that should
be able to reconstruct the secret and are thus called authorized sets. Those subsets that
cannot recover the secret are called unauthorized sets.
Note that Γ has to be monotone for this notion to make sense (see definition 3.4).
Definition 3.6. A Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) is a protocol that enables a dealerD to
distribute a secret S among a set of players P such that only specific groups of people
can reconstruct the secret (the authorized sets).
A secret sharing scheme is completely characterized by its access structure Γ.
i N .B. Because Γ is monotone, any superset A′ of any authorized set A in Γ is
itself an authorized set of players, since the additional players in A′\A can be ignored in
the secret reconstruction. This brings us to the following practical definition:
Definition 3.7. An access structure Γ is completely defined by its minimal set Γ0 where
A ∈ Γ0 if each proper subset of A is not in Γ:
Γ= {A⊆P : B⊆ A,A ∈ Γ0}.
Γ is then called the closure of Γ0 and we write Γ= cl(Γ0), while Γ0 is also known as the
basis of Γ.
iN .B. Usually, only the minimal sets of an access structure are given.
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Definition 3.8. A secret sharing scheme with corresponding access structure Γ is called
perfect if every subset of players in Γ can recover the secret with absolute certainty while
every set not in Γ gets no information whatsoever about the secret through collective
knowledge of their shares.
Remark 3.9. In a perfect secret sharing scheme either the secret is revealed or it is
completely hidden.
We introduced above an example of a special class of secret sharing schemes, the
(k,n) threshold scheme via Shamir and Blakley’s constructions as well as the more spe-
cial case of secret splitting scheme when k = n i.e. the (n,n)-scheme. We now give the
formal definition of a threshold scheme.
Definition 3.10. A (k,n) threshold scheme, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, is a secret sharing scheme
with corresponding access structure
Γ= {A⊆P : |A| ≥ k}. (3.4)
3.1.2.1 A General Model
We present a general model for secret sharing scheme due to Brickell and Stinson
[12]. LetF represent the set of distribution rules (see below),P the set of participants,
K the set of all possible secrets andS the set of all possible shares.
Definition 3.11. A distribution rule is a function
f :P ∪{D}→K ∪S ,
satisfying f (D) ∈K , and f (Pi) ∈S for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where D is the dealer (the trusted
authority).
The distribution rule represents one of the possible ways to distribute the shares to
the participants. For example f (D) is the secret being shared while f (Pi) is the share
given to Pi.
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Notation 3.12. LetF be as above, and for a given K ∈K , we denote byFK the set:
FK = { f ∈F : f (D) = K}.
When the dealer D wishes to share a secret K ∈K , he will chose randomly a distri-
bution rule f ∈FK and use it to distribute the secret K.
Please note that the set FK is public knowledge and there is no need to hide it. Also,
this model is completely general and can be used to study any given construction in se-
cret sharing. It can be appropriately modified to be used in the quantum setting and is
construction independent.
The following definition gives conditions as to when a set of distribution rules for a given
scheme realizes a specified access structure Γ.
Definition 3.13. General setting definition
Given an access structure Γ and a set of distribution rulesF , we introduce the following
two properties:
• (*) Let A ∈ Γ, and suppose, f ,g ∈ F . If f (Pi) = g(Pi) for all Pi ∈ A, then
f (D) = g(D).
• (**) Let A /∈ Γ and suppose f : A→S . Then there exists a non negative integer
λ ( f ,A), such that for all K ∈K ,
|{g ∈FK : g(Pi) = f (Pi), ∀ Pi ∈ A}|= λ ( f ,A).
Theorem 3.14. [12] Given a collection of distribution rules F that satisfy conditions
(*) and (**) of definition (3.13); thenF is a perfect secret sharing scheme realizing the
access structure Γ.
Note that the share of a participant refers specifically to the information the dealer
D sends in private to the participant.
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Remark 3.15. What property (*) says is that the shares given to an authorized subset
uniquely determines the secret.
Remark 3.16. Property (**) says that the shares given to an unauthorized subset give
no information about the secret. This is because given an assignment of shares f (where
f : A→S ) to an unauthorized set A, the conditional probability distribution on K is
the same as the a priori probability distribution onK . That is if pK is the probability
distribution over K and that for every K ∈ K , D chooses uniformly a distribution
rule fK ∈ FK (i.e. each with probability 1|F K |), then when the participants of an
unauthorized subset A /∈ Γ get their shares together (which is represented by f : A→S )
to reconstruct the secret and compute the conditional probability distribution pK (K| f )
one finds that pK = pK (K| f ).
This situation is very similar to the concept of perfect secrecy and the name perfect
secret sharing scheme is thus justified.
Theorem 3.17. [38] Any monotone access structure can be realized by a perfect secret
sharing scheme.
Before we show how this general model can be used to construct a given scheme,
we give one more important definition, that of the information rate of a secret sharing
scheme, which enables us to measure its efficiency.
Definition 3.18. [12] Given the model introduced in definition (3.13), suppose F is a
set of distribution rules for a secret sharing scheme. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define the set of
all possible shares that player Pi might receive
S i = { f (Pi) : f ∈F}.
where clearly S i ⊆S . Once again, let K denote the set of all possible secrets with
|K | < ∞. We can thus think of K ∈K (on account of the finiteness of the set K ) as
being represented (without loss of generality) by a bit-string of length log2 |K | via an
appropriate binary encoding. Similarly, we can think of the share that Pi receives as
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containing log2 |S i|-bits of information.
Thus we can define the individual information rate denoted by τi for Pi as
τi ≡ log2 |K |log2 |S i|
, (3.5)
while the information rate of the scheme is denoted by τ and is defined as
τ = max{τi : 1≤ i≤ n}.
Thus τi is the ratio between the length in the number of bits of a share and that of the
secret.
Lemma 3.19. Suppose F is the set of distribution rules for a perfect secret sharing
scheme realizing an access structure Γ. Then in any given scheme, τ ≤ 1.
Proof. Let A ∈ Γ0 (c.f. def.(3.7)) and let Pi ∈ A. By A|Pi we mean the player Pi deleted
from the set A, i.e. A|Pi ≡ A\{Pi}.
Choose any distribution rule g ∈F , and let g⊥ denote the restriction of g to A|Pi .
By definition of Γ0, A|Pi /∈ Γ. Therefore, there exists a non negative integer λ (g⊥,A|Pi)
satisfying condition (**) of definition (3.13).
Furthermore, for each K ∈K , and for all Pj ∈ A|Pi , there is a distribution rule g⊥K ∈FK
such that g⊥K (Pj) = g⊥(Pj). By property (*) in definition (3.13), g⊥K (Pi) 6= g⊥K′(Pi) if
K 6= K′.
Hence, |S i| ≥ |K |, and thus τ ≤ 1.
Remark 3.20. Practically speaking, for a secret sharing scheme to be of value, we do not
want to distribute too much secret information (i.e. too many shares versus the length of
the secret itself). We thus want the information rate τ to be as close as possible to unity.
Definition 3.21. A secret sharing scheme with information rate τ = 1 is termed ideal on
behalf of τ = 1 being the optimal situation.
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A general access structure that can be realized as an ideal secret sharing scheme
is said to be ideal itself. In this general case, no restrictions on the dimension of the
secret is imposed. This being said, not every access structure can be realized with unit
information rate. One of the important problems in secret sharing is to determine, given
a (monotone) access structure, whether or not there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme.
As promised, we now give a very elegant construction termed the vector space con-
struction, due to Brickell [11], that illustrates perfectly the general construction outlined
above and is an example of an ideal secret sharing scheme.
3.1.2.2 The Vector Space Construction (Brickell ’89 [11])
Let Γ be an access structure, K the set of all possible secrets and S i the set of all
possible shares that the player Pi might get.
Notation 3.22. By GF(q)d we denote the vector space of all d-tuples over the Galois
field GF(q), where d ≥ 2 and q is taken to be a prime, thus giving us the isomorphism
GF(q)' Zq.
Note also, that by 〈v1, · · · ,vi〉 (for some i) we will denote the subspace spanned by the
vectors vi. This establishes what we mean by the notation 〈· · · 〉 as it appears subse-
quently.
Suppose there exists a function ϕ :P ∪{D}→ GF(q)d, satisfying
ϕ(D) ∈ 〈ϕ(Pi) : Pi ∈ A〉 ⇔ A ∈ Γ. (3.6)
That is the vector ϕ(D) can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in the
set {ϕ(Pi) : Pi ∈ A} if and only if A is an authorized subset of Γ.
We construct an ideal secret sharing scheme withK =S i = GF(q),1≤ i≤ n.
Distribution Rules of the Scheme
For every vector~a = (a1,a2, · · · ,ad) ∈ GF(q)d we define a distribution rule f~a where
f~a = ~a ·ϕ(x),︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inner product in GF(q).
∀ x ∈P ∪{D}. (3.7)
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Theorem 3.23. Suppose ϕ satisfies the condition in Eq.(3.6) above, then the collection
of distribution rulesF = { f~a :~a ∈ GF(q)d} is an ideal secret sharing scheme realizing
the access structure Γ.
Proof. Suppose K ∈K is the secret that we want to reconstruct.
If A is an authorized subset of Γ, then the participants in A should be able to compute K.
Since A is authorized, we have that ϕ(D) ∈ 〈ϕ(Pi) : Pi ∈ A〉 therefore, we can write
ϕ(D) = ∑
{i:Pi∈A}
ciϕ(Pi), with each ci ∈ GF(q). (3.8)
Let si ∈S i denote the share given to player Pi, and let~a be an arbitrary (unknown to Pi)
vector chosen by the dealer D . Then si =~a ·ϕ(Pi).
Now since K =~a ·ϕ(D) we get:
~a ·ϕ(D) = ~a · ∑
{i:Pi∈A}
ciϕ(Pi) = ∑
{i:Pi∈A}
ci~a ·ϕ(Pi)
= K = ∑
{i:Pi∈A}
cisi, (3.9)
and therefore condition (*) of definition (3.13) holds.
Now, if A /∈ Γ i.e. A is an unauthorized set, let m denotes the dimension of the subspace
∆i = {ϕ(Pi) : Pi ∈ A}. Again, let D choose uniformly at random a secret K ∈K and
consider the system of equations
ϕ(Pi) ·~a = si, (∀ Pi ∈ A) and ϕ(D) ·~a = K.
The solution space of this system has dimension d−m− 1 and is thus independent of
the secret K. Therefore no {Pi} ∈ A /∈ Γ can get any information about the secret.
We now give an illustration of the above construction revisiting Shamir’s protocol
introduced earlier in Example (3.3) but recast in the vector space construction formalism.
Example 3.24. (Shamir’s (k,n)-threshold scheme revisited)
Let d = k, with each vector~a ∈GF(q)k and let ϕ(Pi) = (1,xi,x2i , · · · ,xk−1i ) ∀ 1≤ i≤ n,
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where each xi is the x-coordinate given to the participant Pi such that si =K+∑k−1j=1 a jx
j
i .
Let ϕ(D) = (1,0, · · · ,0), with as distribution rules f~a =~a · ϕ(x), ∀ x ∈ GF(q)d ,
where the vector~a = (a0,a1, · · · ,ak−1) is arbitrary and picked by the dealer D .
We verify that we are getting the correct distribution rules:
ϕ(D) ·~a = (1,0, · · · ,0) · (a0,a1, · · · ,ak−1)
= a0 mod q = K,
√
which is the secret to be shared among the players.
D computes each share si
si = ~a ·ϕ(Pi),
= (a0,a1,a2, · · · ,ak−1) · (1,xi,x2i , · · · ,xk−1i ) mod q,
= a0+a1xi+a2x2i + · · ·+ak−1xk−1i mod q, ∀ 1≤ i≤ n.
So each player Pi is given as his/her share (xi,si)≡ (i,si) where we have chosen without
loss of generality each xi = i as we did above in example(3.3).
To solve the system of equations, k participants come together with their shares handy
and may use one of the two methods outlined in example(3.3) either the Lagrange in-
terpolation method or the linear system approach. Here we make use of the Lagrange
interpolation method to reconstruct the secret K.
From Eqs.(3.3 ,3.2)
k
∑
j=1
si j ∏
1≤k<n,
j 6=k
−xik
xi j − xik
∣∣∣
xi=i
=
k
∑
j=1
si j ∏
1≤k<n,
j 6=k
−ik
i j− ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
` j(0)≡` 0j
mod p, ∀ 1≤ j ≤ n,
=
k
∑
j=1
` 0j si j
= K.
√
(3.10)
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Where in the vector space construction we can identify the c j ≡ ` 0j as is required in
Eq.(3.9) to reconstruct the secret K.
3.2 Quantum Secret Sharing
Leaving the classical world behind, we start our exploration of the quantum domain
of secret sharing. We mentioned already in the introduction to this chapter that classical
constructions of secret sharing schemes do not carry over automatically into the quan-
tum domain. The main restriction on quantum secret sharing schemes emanates from
the no-cloning theorem 1.19. Informally, this is because if we had no further restric-
tions on which authorized sets can reconstruct the secret, we would be able to clone the
unknown (secret) state and thus violate one of this fundamental theorem of QIT. When
we discussed quantum error corrections in Chapter 2, the same reasoning led us to the
quantum no-cloning bound Eq.(2.32).
Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) schemes generalize in two possible ways the classical
ones. We use a quantum state to (a) share either a secret quantum state or to (b) share a
classical secret. An advantage of the latter over classical secret sharing schemes is that
sometimes the size of the shares can be half that of the size of the secret, whereas we
have shown in the general construction scheme in the classical case that the information
rate τ is at best unity (c.f. lemma (3.19)). On the other hand, if one shares a secret
quantum state, the results of lemma (3.19) still hold in the quantum scenario.
One of the first attempts at generalizing classical secret sharing to the quantum do-
main was that of Hillery, Bužek and Berthiaume [36]. Although we will not be concerned
with eavesdroppers (the way they did), by definition of threshold schemes, we will be
concerned with coalitions of players who try to recover the secret. Those sets are known
as unauthorized sets. These adversaries do exist in the classical world, but take on a new
flavour in the quantum domain, in view of the quantum no cloning theorem.
i N .B. From the start we should point that the two settings are very different in
their philosophies, classically one wants to recover a sequence of bits while quantum
mechanically one wants to bring back a physical particle in the correct state.
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3.2.1 Properties of Quantum Secret Sharing Schemes
In our exploration of quantum secret sharing, we will often be concerned with a
special class of schemes, mainly Quantum Threshold Schemes (QTS). When we state a
theorem without specifying that it is a threshold scheme, we mean that the result holds
for the more general case (i.e. for more general access structures than those obeying a
threshold scheme).
We start with the definition of a quantum threshold secret sharing scheme, which
parallels that of the classical case (c.f def. 3.10).
Notation 3.25. By ((k,n)) we denote a quantum threshold scheme (with a set of double
parentheses) in contrast to the classical threshold scheme (with single parentesis) (k,n).
Definition 3.26. We define a ((k,n)) threshold scheme to be a method to encode and
divide a secret quantum state among n participants such that k of them, pooling their
quantum shares together, can reconstruct the unknown quantum state, while k−1 play-
ers get no information whatsoever about the unknown quantum state (i.e. the secret).
A general quantum secret sharing scheme is completely characterized by its access struc-
ture Γ (c.f. def. 3.5).
Remark 3.27. The fact that k−1 of the players get no information about the secret state
is equivalent to saying that their reduced density matrix is independent of the value of the
secret. We can already draw a parallel with QECC and especially the discussion follow-
ing Eq.(2.23). In both cases, the needed useful information about the qubits is missing.
In QECC, the missing qubits prevent us from correcting the error and thus reconstruct
the original state, while in QSS the missing shares prevent the k− 1 participants from
reconstructing the secret.
Before delving into formal definitions and theorems, we start with an example to
illustrate the philosophy behind secret state reconstruction in QSS. We will consider a
((2,3)) threshold scheme, where the secret state is a qutrit, a three-dimensional quantum
state to be shared among three players in such a way that any two of them combining
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their quantum shares can reconstruct the secret state, but the secret remains completely
unknown to anyone holding only one share.
Example 3.28. ((2,3))-Quantum Threshold Scheme
We illustrate the different aspects of the definition 3.26.
w(Encoding)
Since quantum secret sharing is a quantum code, the dealerD needs to encode the secret
state into a bigger space, the coding space, and to do so he uses the following operation:
Let U2,3 be an isometry (i.e. a map that preserves the distance between vectors) such
that
U2,3(α|0〉+β |1〉+ γ|2〉) = α√
3
(|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉)+ β√
3
(|012〉+ |120〉+ |201〉)+
γ√
3
(|021〉+ |102〉+ |210〉), (3.11)
where all α ,β and γ ∈C are subject to the normalization condition |α|2+ |β |2+ |γ|2 = 1.
H Share Distribution
Each share is a qutrit and the dealer D gives one share to each player.
A Secret Reconstruction
To recover the secret state, any two players can add together their shares ( mod 3). Say
for example that players P2 and P3 want to recover the secret. P2 adds his share to P3
and then P3 adds the resulting share to P2; this is done trit by trit and thus they are left
in the following global state:
1√
3
(|00〉1,3+ |12〉1,3+ |21〉1,3)( α|0〉2+β |1〉2+ γ|2〉2 ) ,
and thus player P2 has the secret quantum state.
Since the isometry U2,3 preserves the cyclic permutation symmetry of the qutrits, the
reconstruction procedure for any other pairs of players is similar to the one detailed
above.
On the other hand, if only one player tries to recover the secret state, one finds that his
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density matrix (tracing out the shares of the other two players) is in the totally mixed
state, and therefore he has no information whatsoever about the original state.
iN .B. Recall in our discussion of QECC that we had recourse to the error syn-
drome to be able to correct for an unknown error without ever measuring the state itself,
otherwise we would have collapsed it irreversibly. Here we are faced with the same dif-
ficulty: we should be careful not to measure individually the shares while reconstructing
the secret. Otherwise, we would lose all possible superpositions and fail to recover the
original state.
In the above ((2,3))-scheme, if we disregard the third input dimension, we have
readily constructed a ((2,3))-quantum secret sharing scheme that can share a secret qubit
state, while each share still remains a qutrit. On the other hand, we cannot have at the
same time a scheme that shares a secret which is a qubit while the shares remain qubits
as well, since we would have constructed a quantum error correction scheme capable of
recovering from one erasure in which the qubit to be transmitted is encoded into three
qubits, which was shown not to exist in [32].
We can arrive at the same conclusion by applying the no-cloning bound Eq.(2.32)
with d−1= 2 (since this is an [[n= 3,k= 1,d = 3]]-QECC) and thus get n> 4 excluding
the n = 3 case; while by the proof of the no-cloning bound above the n = 4 case was
already excluded. We thus see the tight connections between the machinery of quantum
error corrections and quantum secret sharing, which once again although elegant, is
not surprising given that both are quantum codes and must respect the same quantum
constraints and bounds (c.f. the section 2.2.2).
Furthermore, if we trace over a share in ((2,3)) we get a ((2,2))-QSS scheme (that is
the set of all the players taken together is the only authorized set while just one missing
player would invalidate the state reconstruction procedure). This turns out to be a special
case of a more general theorem [24]:
Theorem 3.29. From any ((k,n)) threshold scheme with n > k, a ((k,n−1)) threshold
scheme can be constructed by discarding one share.
We saw in the classical case, that a (k,n) threshold scheme exists for every value of
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n≥ k. However, this does not hold in the quantum world, due to the quantum no-cloning
theorem [25, 66] which leads us to the following theorem [24].
Theorem 3.30. If n≥ 2k then no ((k,n)) threshold scheme exists.
Proof. Assume a ((k,n)) threshold scheme exists with n≥ 2k. We will show that we thus
could bypass the no-cloning theorem and xerox the unknown quantum state as follows:
First, we would apply the ((k,n)) scheme to the secret state to produce n shares. Then,
we could take two disjoint sets of k shares, and reconstruct two independent copies of
the original state. This procedure clearly contradicts the no-cloning theorem 1.19.
We next make the distinction between pure and mixed states quantum secret sharing
(QSS) schemes, before looking at the QECC/QSS schemes correspondence.
Definition 3.31. In a pure state scheme the system of all the shares taken together is in
a pure state for every encoding of a pure state of the secret. When the encoding of a pure
state of the system results in a mixed state, the scheme is termed mixed state scheme.
Remark 3.32. If one measures the efficiency of a quantum secret sharing scheme in
terms of the number of shares per participant, then we need the implicit condition that
each share is of the same size of that of the secret.
Surprisingly, mixed state schemes can achieve better performance (in terms of share
size) than pure state schemes, as we shall soon discover.
3.2.2 The QSS/QECC Correspondence and its Consequences
Classically, one can always associate an error correcting code to a perfect secret shar-
ing scheme; though determining the access structure of the associated scheme can be a
very difficult task. On the other hand, quantum mechanically this transition from quan-
tum error correcting codes to quantum secret sharing schemes is not so straightforward
since the no cloning theorem has to be respected and puts constraints on the allowed
access structures.
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In this subsection we explicitly reformulate the quantum error correction schemes in
terms of the secret sharing nomenclature (and/or vice versa), which enables us to readily
prove some important theorems on quantum secret sharing schemes.
Let the set of n players be denoted byP and let f : |ψ〉 7−→ |φ〉 be the encoding of the
states |ψ〉 onto codewords |φ〉.
1. Recall that an authorized subset A ∈ Γ of players is the collection of those players
who can recover the secret encoded quantum state. We first reformulate this con-
dition in terms of correcting erasure errors:
In order for a set A of players to be able to reconstruct the state, the overall encod-
ing f must have the property that it can correct for the erasure of the qubits held
by the players not in A.
That is to say, A ∈ Γ is an authorized set if the encoding f corrects erasure errors
for the shares held by the complement {P1, · · ·Pn}\A of A.
2. Let ρ denote the density matrix of the codewords |φ〉. That is, ρ is a description
of the global state of shares distributed to the players Pi inP . Now, we recall that
a set of players B /∈ Γ who cannot (and is not allowed to) reconstruct the secret
state is termed unauthorized set. In QECC those subsets of players should have no
information about the original encoded states, which translates as follows in terms
of their density matrix.
The density matrix ρB associated with any subset B /∈ Γ is independent of the
encoded state |φ〉; for if this were not true, then players in B would be able to gain
information about |φ〉 by making an appropriate measurement that would (at least)
partially distinguish ρB(|φ〉) from ρB(|ϕ〉) for some pair of states |φ〉 and |ϕ〉 with
different density matrices ρB.
3. Next, we make use of the reformulated QECC conditions (c.f. remark 2.35) to
prove the following lemma. In Corollary 3.35 below, we give a similar proof
using the no-cloning theorem to show how both techniques are complementary.
Lemma 3.33. For a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme (c.f. def. 3.31), a
set B is unauthorized if and only if its complement Bc is an authorized set.
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Proof. Let A and B be complementary sets. A is an authorized set if and only
if the encoding f can correct erasure errors on B, which by the QECC condition
(in density matrix form) is equivalent to saying that Tr(ρE) is independent of the
encoded state |φ〉 for all operators E acting on B.
Now, since E acts only on the set B, we have that Tr(ρE) = TrB(ρBE) and by a
proper choice of basis for E (for example E = | j〉〈k|) ,we find that TrB(ρBE) is
independent of |φ〉 for all E if and only if ρB is itself independent of |φ〉 for all E.
This is precisely the definition given in part (2) of an unauthorized set.
Which is also to say that 〈φ |E|φ〉=Λ(E) is independent of |φ〉 exactly the QECC
condition in Eq.(2.22).
Thus A is authorized if and only if B is unauthorized.
We finally recast all that we have said above in the following theorem (slightly reformu-
lated), which first appeared in [24].
Theorem 3.34. Let C be a subspace of a Hilbert spaceH that can be written as tensor
product of the Hilbert spaces of various coordinates. Let f : |ψ〉 7−→ |φ〉 be an encoding
with C as its image. Then f is a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme if and only if
〈φ |E|φ〉= Λ(E) (3.12)
(i.e. independent of |φ〉) whenever E is any operator acting on the complement of an
authorized set or when E is any operator acting on an unauthorized set.
Proof. The discussion of (1), (2) and the proof of (3) readily yields the stated theorem.
A natural corollary of theorem 3.34, which shows how special pure state schemes are
in the sense that they are only possible for a highly restricted class of access structures,
is the following [31]:
Corollary 3.35. In a pure state quantum secret sharing scheme, every authorized set is
precisely the complement of an unauthorized set (and vice-versa).
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Proof. If the complement B of an authorized set A was also an authorized set, we could
thus create two identical and independent copies of the secret state precisely violating the
quantum no-cloning theorem. Therefore the complement of an authorized set is always
an unauthorized set.
On the other hand by the proof of Lemma 3.33, if 〈φ |E|φ〉=Λ(E) holds, we can correct
erasures on B and therefore reconstruct the secret on the complement of B i.e. on A
which is an authorized set. Therefore, the complement of an unauthorized set is always
an authorized set.
We also note the following terminology:
Definition 3.36. A quantum access structure Γ is called maximal if the authorized and
unauthorized sets are complements of each other.
Furthermore, in the more specific case of threshold schemes, we can derive an ex-
act equation relating the threshold number of shares to the total number of participants
provided the encoding gives rise to a pure quantum threshold scheme:
Corollary 3.37. Any ((k,n)) pure state threshold scheme satisfies n = 2k−1.
Proof. Once again, let the set of n players be denoted by P and let A and B be com-
plementary sets. Assume that A contains t players. Therefore |B| = n− t. Since A is
authorized if and only if B is unauthorized (by Cor.3.35), we must have that t ≥ k if
and only if n− t ≤ k− 1. For t = k we get that n− k ≤ k− 1, which is rearranged to
n≤ 2k−1. On the other hand, for t = k−1, we get n−k+1 > k−1, or n > 2k−2. For
those two inequalities to be simultaneously valid, it must be that n = 2k−1. These are
the only allowed values for a pure state quantum threshold secret sharing scheme.
iN .B. We note therefore that in a pure quantum threshold scheme ((k,n)), the
number of players n must be odd and that its access structure Γ must be maximal. This
last corollary does not apply to mixed state schemes. We will see later (c.f. Corol-
lary 3.39 and Theorem 3.42) that one can construct ((k,n)) threshold schemes with
n < 2k−1.
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In [24] it is remarked that indeed this QECC/QSS correspondence is further enhanced
via the following theorem, which is a generalization of the fact that the five-qubit quan-
tum code proposed in [20, 30], mainly the [[5,1,3]]-stabilizer code, yields readily a
((3,5))-quantum threshold scheme since it corrects any two erasure errors6 enabling
the secret to be reconstructed from any three given shares; while from two or less shares
no information whatsoever can be extracted about the original data.
Theorem 3.38. If a quantum code with codewords of length 2k−1 corrects k−1 erasure
errors which for stabilizer codes (c.f. section 2.1.2) is a [[2k− 1,1,k]]q code, where
q is the dimensionality of each coordinate and of the encoded state, then it is also a
((k,2k−1)) threshold scheme.
Proof. First suppose we start with a set A of k shares. This set precisely excludes k−1
shares and by the properties of stabilizer codes we know that this code corrects k− 1
erasure errors and thus the secret can be reconstructed from those k shares held by A and
is therefore an authorized set.
On the other hand given a set B of k−1 shares, this subset excludes precisely k shares,
from which we know the secret can be reconstructed. Now assume we can gain some
information about the secret by observing the k−1 shares in B. Since this is the quantum
world, we know that any gain of information about a state instantaneously collapses it
and thus there is no way we can recover the secret from those k shares (since they are
now disturbed) and thus we run into a contradiction.
Combining Theorem 3.29 with Theorem 3.38 above, we get the following corollary
Corollary 3.39. From a [[2k− 1,1,k]]q code, a ((k,n)) threshold scheme can be con-
structed for any n < 2k.
For example, as already mentioned above, from the five-qubit code [[5,1,3]], we get
a ((3,5))-quantum threshold scheme and by applying the corollary above a ((3,4)) and
((3,3)) threshold schemes can be obtained by discarding shares.
6Recall that an erasure error is a general error on a known coordinate such that a quantum error-
correcting code of distance d can correct d−1 erasure errors or b(d−1)/2c general errors.
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On the other hand, in Example 3.28 as a consequence of Theorem 3.38, we have
that the ((2,3))-quantum threshold scheme is a [[3,1,2]]3-quantum error correcting sta-
bilizer code of length 3 correcting one erasure error with dimension q = 3, i.e. a qutrit
as described in the example.
Remark 3.40. In some sense, every quantum secret sharing scheme is an error correct-
ing code but unfortunately the reverse is not true as we will first see in the following
example. We deffer to the end of this chapter for the possibility of overcoming this limi-
tation (c.f. Corollary 3.54).
Example 3.41. Is the [[4,1,2]]-QECC a ((3,4))-QTS ?
Consider the following four qubit-encoding which corrects one erasure error [32, 65]:
V3,4 : α|0〉+β |1〉 7−→ 12α(|0000〉+ |1111〉)+
1
2
β (|0011〉+ |1100〉)≡ |Λ〉. (3.13)
We know from Corollary 3.37 that this cannot be a ((3,4)) QTS because 4 6= 2×3−1;
let us see where it fails.
w(Encoding)
The dealer D uses the map V3,4 to encode the secret state |ΨS〉= α|0〉+β |1〉 as shown
above to get |Λ〉, with the promise that |α|2+ |β |2 = 1.
H (Share Distribution)
ThenD gives each Player Pi (1≤ i≤ 4) a quantum share from |Λ〉 (keeping in mind that
each share is a qubit).
A (Secret Reconstruction)
To recover the secret state |ΨS〉 three players out of four need to cooperate. For example:
• The two players P4 and P3 cooperate such that P4 adds his share to P3 mod 2:
|Λ〉 7−→ 1
2
α(|0000〉+ |1101〉)+ 1
2
β (|0001〉+ |1100〉)≡ |Λ4,3〉
.
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• Next, P2 and P4 cooperate, such that P2 adds her share to P4:
|Λ4,3〉 7−→ 12α(|0000〉+ |1100〉)+
1
2
β (|0001〉+ |1101〉)≡ |Λ2,4〉.
Grouping together the shares:
|Λ2,4〉= 12(|000〉+ |110〉)(α|0〉4+β |1〉4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
|ΨS〉
.
Thus we see that player P4 has the secret state and therefore the [[4,1,2]]-quantum error
correcting code looks like a ((3,4)) secret sharing threshold scheme.
That would be the end of the story if we forgot that QTS must be perfect secret
sharing schemes. We want to make sure that no information leaks to less than three
players. To check for this possibility we compute the reduced density matrix on any two
players, say (without loss of generality) for example of players P1 and P3.
ρ13 =
1
2
|α|2(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)+ 1
2
|β |2(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|).
In view of the result, we conclude that if the two players cooperate, their density ma-
trix depends on α and β and thus can get statistical information about their relative
values. Already if they measure their qubits they can differentiate the secret α from β
just by announcing if they get the same {{00},{11}} or different results {{10},{01}}
respectively.
For completeness, if we compute the reduced density matrix for just one player say
P1 we get
ρ1 =
1
2
(|α|2(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)+ 1
2
|β |2(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) = I
2
,
and therefore the reduced density matrix depends neither on α nor on β ; i.e. no single
player gets any information about the secret as should have been the case with two
players as well.
This was an example of a quantum code that is an error correcting code but not a
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perfect ((k,n)) secret sharing scheme, since information about the secret is leaked out to
less than k cooperating players. We will not consider such imperfect schemes from now
on.
Finally, we give the reciprocal of Theorem 3.30, which first appeared in [24] where
the authors gave a constructive proof using a class of quantum polynomial codes sim-
ilar to those defined by Aharonov and Ben-Or in [1]. The authors gave a construction
for such a code whenever m < 2k where m is the length parameter of the code and of
(quantum polynomial) degree k−1. They showed how the encoded data can always be
recovered from any set of k of its m coordinates. Thus, they constructed an [[m,1,k]]-
quantum code for the specific case of m = 2k− 1 and by applying Corollary 3.39 they
obtained the desired ((k,n))- threshold scheme when n = m.
Theorem 3.42. [24] If n < 2k, then a ((k,n))-threshold scheme exists. Moreover, the
dimension of each share can be bounded from above by 2max(2k−1,s), where s is the
dimension of the quantum secret.
Although we have said that pure quantum secret sharing schemes are a special case,
they still play a fundamental role in the general theory of QSS as we will see in the
following section by presenting more properties of general access structures and a gen-
eralization of Theorem 3.29 which was given for the special case of threshold schemes.
3.2.3 A Closer Look at General Access Structures
In this section, we are concerned with constructing general access structures and to
do so we take a small step back and look once again at the classical world. In classical
secret sharing, any monotone access structure (c.f. Definition 3.4) can be described by
concatenating threshold schemes [31]. The concatenation is done in the following way:
the shares of one scheme is used as the secret to be shared by the other scheme. We give
an example to illustrate the idea and by the same token review some ideas from classical
schemes.
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Example 3.43. Consider the set of players P4 = {P1,P2,P3,P4} and the following ac-
cess structure7 Γ = {{P1,P2,P3},{P1,P4}}. For this purpose, we are going to use a
(5,7)-classical threshold scheme. The dealer D has a total of seven shares to distribute
among P4 and any subset of Γ having five (or more) of those shares will be able to
reconstructS . In order to realize the first authorized set (call it A), we give three shares
to player P1, and one share each to players P2 and P3. In order to realize the second
authorized set B = {P1,P4}, we give P1 three shares but this time two shares to P4.
iN .B. When the number of shares given to each player is not identical we call such a
scheme asymmetric.
For more general schemes, the technique known as "concatenation" can be used. We
illustrate this technique with the same access structure Γ above to share a secretS .
¬ First construct a (1,2) threshold scheme for S (note that such a scheme is trivial).
Let the shares be s1 and s2.
­ Next, we construct a (3,3) threshold scheme for s1 and give one share to each player
in A = {P1,P2,P3}.
® Repeat the same for the subset B i.e. share s2 as a secret among P1 and P4.
In this way we have created a secret sharing scheme for Γ by concatenating threshold
schemes as described above.
An important lesson from the above example is the way we concatenate the schemes
to get another scheme. In [31] Gottesman gives an explanation why this technique works.
The main idea is actually borrowed from a very important classical construction [5]:
The Monotone Circuit Construction [38] reviewed in [64]. As the name implies it is a
construction that readily respects the main property common to classical and quantum
secret sharing schemes, namely monotonicity (c.f. Definition 3.4) but some care needs
to be taken in generalizing the construction to the quantum domain.
Any access structure can be written in a disjunctive normal form, which is the OR of
7We emphasize that the secret sharing protocol is completely determined by its access structure Γ and
although in this example we have only four players we do not want to realize an arbitrary four-player SSS,
but we want to realize the access structure given above and that is why we need a (5,7)-threshold scheme
instead of say a trivial (4,4) scheme (giving each player a single share) which would be a 4-player scheme
but would not realize the associated Γ.
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a list of authorized sets. For our example above, with the access structure Γ and the two
authorized subsets A and B, the normal form realizing Γ is (P1 AND P2 AND P3) OR
(P1 AND P4), where we see the importance of the share holder P1 for the success of the
scheme. We note that the AND gate corresponds to (t, t) threshold schemes, with t = 3
for "P1 AND P2 AND P3" and t = 2 for "P1 AND P4". We also note that the AND gate
corresponds to a (2,2) threshold scheme. This is true of the AND gate in (P1 AND P4)
but not those in (P1 AND P2 AND P3) having one authorized set P1 AND P4, while the
OR gate corresponds to a (1,2) threshold scheme since all the variables in the predicate
are fulfilled i.e. either the authorized subset A OR B can reconstruct the secret. This
is thus done by concatenating the appropriate set of threshold schemes. This technique
would not work directly in the quantum domain because the QTS that would be needed
to implement the OR gate doe snot exist.
Before discussing the quantum analog of the previous example, we need the follow-
ing theorem, which first appeared in [31]. The theorem helps a great deal in generalizing
pure state secret sharing schemes and shows the important role they play in QSS con-
structions. Here, we give the proof that D. Gottesman gave in [31] while the access
structure for the corresponding pure state scheme was given by A. Smith [62] using the
Monotone Span Program construction (MSP for short), which we will sketch very briefly
in the next section.
Theorem 3.44. Every mixed state QSS scheme can be described as a pure state QSS
scheme by discarding one share.
Proof. [31] Let S be the Hilbert space of the secret and let V be a superoperator
mapping S to density operators on H . If the encoding is a mixed state encoding we
can purify it by adding an extra share. Denote the space corresponding to the extra share
by E . The superoperator V can thus be extended to a unitary mapping S 7−→H ⊗E .
Purifying the scheme will not turn authorized sets into unauthorized sets or vise versa.
Once again we use the QSS/QECC correspondance in what follows:
Consider a set U containing the extra share E we look at its complement Uc (such
that E /∈Uc). If Uc is an authorized set then we can correct for erasure errors on U and
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condition 2.22 and its consequence Equation 2.23 hold and thus we can get no informa-
tion whatsoever about the secret from U . On the other hand, if Uc is an unauthorized set,
we can correct erasure on its complement and thus reconstruct the unknown state from
just U and therefore U is an authorized set. To recover the original mixed state scheme
we just need to discard the extra share E .
This theorem generalizes Theorem 3.29 for threshold schemes. It is one of the cor-
nerstones of quantum secret sharing theory since any theorem or statement about QSS
can now be proved by just giving the proof for the purification of the scheme if the latter
is mixed. Working with pure state schemes is far more elegant than with mixed states
since one has powerful tools and techniques not available for the latter.
For example the quantum information theoretical approach to quantum secret shar-
ing [48] and to quantum error correcting codes [21] relies extensively on the purification
technique to compute the entropy of a secret and thus the mutual information between
the secret state and its reference system or the amount of information that a given set of
players can gain from their coalition (c.f. [57] for detailed calculations in that direction).
The following theorem asserts that we can concatenate quantum schemes to get a new
one which is also a valid secret sharing scheme. The proof given by Gottesman in [31]
follows closely that of Theorem 3.44 given above using the QECC/QSS correspondence
together with the property of monotonicity of a larger set which has as one of its subsets
an authorized set.
Theorem 3.45. If S 1 and S 2 are quantum secret sharing schemes, then the scheme
formed by expanding each share in S 1 as the secret of S 2 is also a secret sharing
scheme.
The theorem tells us how to concatenate the schemes and thus we are finally ready
to revisit the quantum version of Example 3.43.
Example 3.46. ((2,3))-Concatenated Quantum Schemes
The construction we described in Example 3.43 fails when we consider its quantum
counterpart because the no-cloning theorem prevents us from having a valid ((1,2))
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secret sharing scheme i.e. the OR gate cannot be used in the quantum version of con-
catenating schemes as we had already observed. To overcome this difficulty, Gottesman
suggests in [31] to replace the OR gate by the majority function; i.e. replacing the (1,2)-
classical scheme by an ((r,2r−1)) quantum scheme where r is the number of authorized
sets in the access structure one wants to construct. That is, r of the quantum shares will
be those of the desired access structure while the remaining r− 1-quantum shares will
be those forming another access structure much simpler to construct.
For the access structure of Example 3.43 Γ = {A1,A2} where A1 = {P1,P2,P3} and
A2 = {P1,P4} with secret S , we first note that because of the monotonic property of
threshold schemes, adding an extra share to an authorized set will not alter its capa-
bility to reconstruct the secret while we have to be cautious in doing so to respect the
quantum nocloning theorem.
We construct a ((2,3))-quantum concatenated scheme as follows:
Let the secret we want to share be S and denote the shares of the ((2,3))-quantum
threshold scheme by s1, s2 and s3.
¶ First, we construct a maximal access structure (c.f. Definition 3.36) for Γ above by
recalling that the complements of the authorized sets namely {P4} and {P2,P3} or any
of their subsets, should not be added to the new access structure we are trying to con-
struct. This leaves us with two subsets A3 = {P2,P4} and A4 = {P3,P4}. Thus the new
access structure is now given by Γ′ = {{P1,P2,P3},{P1,P4},{P2,P4},{P3,P4}} which is
maximal.
· Now, as in the classical case, let s1 be the secret we will share via a ((3,3))-QTS for
the players in the subset A1 and s2 the secret for the ((2,2))-QTS for those in A2.
¸ We note that Γ ⊂ Γ′ and assume that a scheme for such a maximal access structure
exists8. Then we can share s3 using this scheme for Γ′ and by Theorem 3.45, we would
have completed our construction of a quantum concatenated schemes.
8If it does not exist, this technique does not work.
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This scheme is summarized by the following equation [31]
((2,3))− scheme

((3,3)) : P1, P2, P3
((2,2)) : P1, P4
Γ′
(3.14)
The scheme is read as follows: The three rows represent the shares of the ((2,3))-
scheme. The first two rows are threshold schemes, while the last row is the maximal
access structure Γ′. Any two rows (out of three) is sufficient to reconstruct the secretS .
Here for example, player P1 gets a share from each row while player P4 would get only
two, one from the second row and one from the third.
Example 3.46 above is a special case of the general ((r,2r− 1))-quantum scheme.
In [31] Gottesman gives the recursive construction in the general case, which itself is a
proof for the following core theorem involving quantum secret sharing schemes that in
some sense summarizes all the properties and theorems we have presented so far:
Theorem 3.47. A quantum secret sharing scheme exists for an access structure Γ if and
only if Γ is monotone and satisfies the quantum no-cloning theorem. Furthermore, for
any maximal quantum access structure, a pure state scheme exists.
3.2.3.1 Monotone Span Program (MSP)
As we mentioned earlier, the construction of an access structure for the pure state
scheme of Theorem 3.44 was given in [62] using the Monotone Span Program:
Definition 3.48. A monotone span program (MSP) over a set P is a triple (K,M,ψ)
whereK is a finite field, M is a d×e matrix overK and ψ : {1, . . . ,d}→ P is a surjective
function which (effectively) labels each row of M by a member of P.
The idea behind using MSP to construct QTS is to be able to relate QTS to CSS codes
(c.f. Section 2.2.1.1). One starts by constructing a matrix from a CSS code that is needed
for the MSP construction. Then this matrix is used to show that a CSS code over two
classical MDS codes with parameters [[2k−1,k,k]]q and [[2k−1,k−1,k+1]]q (c.f. the
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construction of Theorem 2.44) can be interpreted as a ((k,2k−1)) QTS. Finally, one can
prove that a ((k,2k−1)) QTS made from the MSP construction can be translated into a
[[2k− 1,1,k]]q quantum MDS code thus relating the MSP construction to Gottesman’s
theorem cited above. The details of the construction can be found in the original paper
by A. Smith [62] and an information theoretical approach to the MSP construction could
be found in [57].
3.3 Quantum Secret Sharing Without Quantum Channels
Up to know, we never questioned what kind of resources were needed for construct-
ing quantum threshold schemes. Since we still do not have a scalable quantum computer,
we need to be as economic as possible in our quantum devices. It is still far from trivial
to be able to manipulate a large number of qubits as would require the implementation
of any given quantum algorithm.
Here since we are mainly concerned with quantum secret sharing protocols, we look
at what we have presented so far to guide us to solve this quantum economical question.
For example, the recursive construction of a ((r,2r−1))-general secret sharing scheme
as demonstrated in Example 3.46 is far from being efficient. We see this first, because
we need a plethora of quantum shares when constructing the maximal access structure
Γ′. Second, the threshold schemes in the first and second rows of Equation 3.14 depend
on the details of the schemes themselves and unless those schemes are efficient, the
entire procedure becomes exceedingly needy in quantum shares. Of course, the best
way to save on our quantum computer is to use as few quantum shares as possible, and
in doing so we also save on the quantum channels that are needed between the users to
reconstruct the secret. We therefore save on the technology and on the number of qubits
that are needed to be under control to implement such an important scheme as secret
sharing.
In this section, we present a protocol that we first introduced in [13] that resolves this
issue of needing a plethora of quantum shares per player. In fact our protocol is maxi-
mally efficient in the sense that it requires one quantum share per player. This quantum
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share is the one given to each player by the dealerD . So in an n-player protocol we only
need a total of n quantum shares to implement it. Therefore, we only need one quantum
channel9 between the dealer D and each player Pi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n). The reconstruc-
tion procedure between players can be achieved with purely classical communication
between the players, although the resulting reconstructed state is quantum.
What we have described so far sounds like quantum teleportation (c.f. the prelimi-
nary section). Thus why can’t we trivially use quantum teleportation [6] to share our
given secret quantum state? Indeed in [3], using quantum teleportation, it was shown
how to construct a ((2,2))-quantum threshold scheme which can be straightforwardly
generalized to ((n,n))-QTS. The problem with the construction is twofolds:
1. The construction in [3] gives a non-perfect threshold scheme. That is, although the
n players can reconstruct the quantum secret perfectly, it is not true that coalitions
of less than n players get no information about the secret. In fact it was shown
in [57] using information theoretical tools that indeed this was the case and thus
concluded that the protocol was a non perfect quantum threshold scheme. The
same problem was encountered earlier in Example 3.41, which prevented us from
triumphantly say that: “every quantum error correcting code is also a quantum
secret sharing scheme”. The example was introduced mainly to refute this kind of
non-perfect threshold schemes.
2. The construction uses quadratically more quantum shares than our protocol. We
state this as a theorem and give the proof [13]:
Theorem 3.49. In a one-qubit teleportation-based ((n,n))-secret sharing scheme, n
2−n
2
shared |Ψ−〉 states are necessary and sufficient for the reconstruction of the secret.
Moreover, if we add the requirement that each share of the encoded state (in the dis-
tribution phase of the protocol) consists of one qubit, the total number of qubits required
for the teleportation-based scheme is n2.
Proof. As usual, letD be the dealer and letP be the total set of participants. Since each
participant Pi ∈P (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the potential receiver of the secret state, each Pi
9That is only one use of the quantum channel.
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must be linked to every other participant by at least one disjoint path consisting of |Ψ−〉
states. In other words, if we see the participants as vertices vi, and the shared EPR-pairs
(i.e. entanglement) as edges ei j, thus forming what is known as a Kn EPR-graph, we have
that each vertex vi must have degree d(vi) ≥ n− 1. Counting the degree at each vertex
yields a lower bound of n(n− 1)/2 for the total number of edges. Since the complete
EPR-graph Kn, satisfies our criteria, we have the desired result.
Finally, since the dealer D gives each participant Pi one qubit as a share, we have thus a
total of n+2
1
2
(n2−n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
edges
= n2 qubits required for this teleportation-based scenario.
Clearly, to overcome the problems mentioned above, we need a protocol that pre-
serves secrecy, respects the threshold structure of the QSS-scheme and uses only one
quantum share per player. Before presenting our protocol, which respects those charac-
teristics, we need an important tool know as quantum encryption first introduced in [2].
3.3.1 Quantum Encryption of Qubits
The encryption scheme of qubits works as follows: Suppose we have an n-qubit
quantum state |Ψ〉 and a random sequence of 2n classical bits. We associate to each qubit
a pair of classical bits a qubit that determines which transformation σ ∈ {I,X ,Y,Z} is
to be applied to the respective qubit. If the pair is {00}, the identity I is applied to the
qubit; if {01}, X is applied; if {10}, Y is applied and finally if the pair is {11} we apply
Z. Clearly if σ is chosen uniformly at random in the set, the resulting quantum state |Ψ′〉
is completely mixture i.e.
ρ|Ψ′〉 =
1
4
(
I|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|I+X |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|X +Y |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|Y +Z|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|Z)= 1
2
I,
i.e. the totally mixed state for any given |Ψ′〉.
However, with the knowledge of the classical 2n-bit sequence, the sequence of op-
erators that was applied to |Ψ〉 is known therefore the process can be reversed and the
state |Ψ〉 recovered.
iN .B. Thus, classical data can be used to encrypt quantum data.
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We will also need the following definition:
Definition 3.50. Informally, by a Local Operation and Classical Communication (LOCC)
measurement we mean one that can be implemented by two (or more) parties using only
local quantum operations and classical communication.
3.3.2 Protocol for Quantum Secret Sharing with LOCC
We finally present our ((n,n))-threshold Quantum Secret Sharing with Classical Re-
construction (QSS-CR) protocol (c.f. Figure 3.2 for a diagrammatic representation). In
the first and most crucial step, we will use a partial encryption as opposed to the full
encryption presented above, but the idea remains identical.
Suppose the dealer D wishes to share the quantum secret state |Ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β |1〉
among a setP of n participants (with the usual normalization condition |α|2+ |β |2 = 1).
1. (Partial encryption)
The dealer chooses uniformly at random x ∈ {0,1}.
¬ If x = 0, he does nothing (i.e. applies the identity) to |Ψ〉 for this step.
­ If x = 1, he applies the negation transformation, N (c.f. Equation 1.2).
Let the resulting state be |Ψ′〉= α ′|0〉+β ′|1〉 .
2. w(Encoding)
The dealer encodes |Ψ′〉 into an n-qubit state by creating n−1 pseudo-copies; the
resulting state is a GHZ-state mainly:
|Ψ′′〉= α ′|0n〉+β ′|1n〉 (3.15)
3. H (Share Distribution)
The dealer D picks uniformly at random a bit string x′ = x1x2 . . .xn such that⊕n
i=1 xi = x (i.e s.t. the parityΠ(x′)= x) and gives each player Pi a share consisting
of a classical bit xi and of a qubit |·〉i from |Ψ′′〉.
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4. A (Secret Reconstruction)
The players decide who will receive the secret; say that they agree on player 1.
Then they do the following:
• Player i (i= 2,3, . . . ,n) applies the Hadamard transform H (c.f. Equation 1.4)
to his qubit.
• Player i (i = 2,3, . . . ,n) measures his qubit in the computational basis.
Let the outcome be yi. This value, along with xi is sent to P1.
• Player 1 computes y =⊕ni=2 yi.
If y = 0, he does nothing. If y = 1, he applies Z to his qubit:
Z =
 1 0
0 −1
 . (3.16)
• Player 1 computes x =⊕ni=1 xi.
¬ If x = 0, he does nothing.
­ If x = 1, he applies N to his qubit.
The result is the reconstructed secret.
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Figure 3.2: The QSS-Protocol with Classical Reconstruction.
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3.3.2.1 Correctness and Privacy
We now show using the mathematical properties of the GHZ-state introduced in Sec-
tion 1.1.3 that our QSS-CR protocol produces the correct output (Theorem 3.51) and that
it is secure against collusion of less than n players (Theorem 3.52).
Theorem 3.51. At the end of the QSS-CR protocol, the intended recipient has the initial
quantum state |Ψ〉.
Proof. After the execution of the Partial Encryption, the Encoding and Share Distribu-
tion steps of the protocol, the n players decide who will receive the secret state. Say they
agree (without loss of generality) on the nth player Pn. We follow the steps of the Secret
Reconstruction phase.
After the Encoding step, the state of the n shares is:
|Ψ′′〉= α ′|0n〉+β ′|1n〉 (3.17)
Let P denote the set of all players. Now all Pi ∈P (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) apply to their
shares the Hadamard transform:
|Ψ〉P = (Hn−1⊗ I)|Ψ′′〉 = α ′Hn−1 |00 . . .0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
|0〉n+β ′Hn−1 |11 . . .1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
|1〉n,
=
α ′√
N
N−1
∑
y=0
|y〉|0〉n+ β
′
√
N
N−1
∑
y=0
(−1)P(y)|y〉|1〉n,
=
1√
N
N−1
∑
y=0
|y〉⊗ (α ′|0〉n+(−1)P(y)β ′|1〉n), (3.18)
where P(y) = y1 + y2 + . . .yn−1, N = 2n−1 and we made use of the properties of the
Hadamard transformed GHZ-state Equation 1.26 (appropriately modified).
Let |Ψ(y)〉 denote the state:
|Ψ(y)〉 ≡ α ′|0〉+(−1)P(y)β ′|1〉. (3.19)
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We compute the density matrix of the system |Ψ〉P .
ρP =
1
N
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
|y〉〈y′|⊗ |Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)|. (3.20)
Now players Pi (i = 1,2, . . . ,n−1) measure their qubits in the computational basis (i.e.
we trace over those shares).
ρPn =
N−1
∑
k=0
(〈k|⊗ I) ρP (|k〉⊗ I),
=
1
N
N−1
∑
k=0
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
(〈k|⊗ I) |y〉〈y′|⊗ |Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)| (|k〉⊗ I),
=
1
N
N−1
∑
k=0
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
〈k|y〉︸︷︷︸
δk,y
|Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)| 〈y′|k〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
δk,y′
,
=
1
N
N−1
∑
y=0
|Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y)|. (3.21)
Let the result of player Pi’s measurement of his qubit be yi. Each Pi now sends the couple
(xi,yi) to player Pn where xi is the bit received from the dealer D subject to the partial
encryption condition x =
⊕n
i=1 xi.
Now, since Pn has received all the yi’s he can compute P(y) = y1+y2+ . . .+yn−1, which
appears in |Ψ(y)〉n and therefore the sum in Equation 3.21 evaluates to N|Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y)|
for the given P(y) i.e.
ρPn = |Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y)|. (3.22)
Expanding Equation 3.22
ρPn = |α ′|2|0〉〈0|+(−1)P(y)
(
α ′β ′∗|0〉〈1|+β ′α ′∗|1〉〈0|)+ |β ′|2|1〉〈1|
=
 |α ′|2 (−1)P(y)α ′β ′∗
(−1)P(y)β ′α ′∗ |β ′|2
 (3.23)
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Since player Pn has all the yi’s he computes P(y).
If P(y) = 0, he has readily the (partially encrypted) secret state:
ρFinalPn = I ρ
(0)
Pn I =
 |α ′|2 α ′β ′∗
β ′α ′∗ |β ′|2

= |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|. (3.24)
While if P(y) = 1 he applies the Z operator to his qubit to recover the original state
ρFinalPn = Z ρ
(1)
Pn Z =
 1 0
0 −1
 |α ′|2 −α ′β ′∗
−β ′α ′∗ |β ′|2
 1 0
0 −1

= |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|, (3.25)
where ρ0Pn and ρ
1
Pn denote ρPn evaluated at P(y) = 0 and P(y) = 1 respectively.
Since Pn also has all the xi’s he can now compute x =
⊕n
i=1 xi and now decrypt his
state via
(
α ′,β ′
)
=

(α,β ) if x = 0, i.e. he does nothing,
(β ,α) if x = 1, i.e. he applies N.
(3.26)
Theorem 3.52. In the QSS-CR protocol, any subset of k < n players can get no infor-
mation whatsoever about the initial state |Ψ〉.
Proof. We assume that players P1,P2, . . . ,Pn−1 pool their quantum shares together as
well as their classical bits xi in an attempt to recover the original state. We now show
that their joint state is independent of the initial secret state |Ψ〉.
Taking into account the partial encryption of the original state, and denoting by
Π(x′) ∈ {0,1} the parity of x′ = x1x2 · · ·xn subject to the condition x =⊕ni=1 xi we have
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that the total density matrix of the system that the dealer D now holds is given by:
ρFullD = ∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉〈x|⊗NΠ(x′)|Ψ〉〈Ψ|NΠ(x′),
=
1
2
ρ|Ψ〉+
1
2
ρN|Ψ〉. (3.27)
Recall that after encoding and share distribution the density matrix of the n players
was again given by
ρP =
1
N
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
|y〉〈y′|⊗ |Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)|. (3.28)
with |Ψ(y)〉 ≡ α ′|0〉+(−1)P(y)β ′|1〉. Combining equations (3.27) and (3.28) we thus
have that the full density matrix of theP-set is given by
ρFullP =
1
2N
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
|y〉〈y′|⊗
(
|Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)|+N|Ψ(y)〉n〈Ψ(y′)|N
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρFullPn
. (3.29)
In matrix form:
ρFullPn =
 |α ′|2 (−1)P(y′)α ′β ′∗
(−1)P(y)β ′α ′∗ (−1)P(y)+P(y′)|β ′|2
 +
 |β ′|2 (−1)P(y′)β ′α ′∗
(−1)P(y)α ′β ′∗ (−1)P(y)+P(y′)|α ′|2

=
 |α ′|2+ |β ′|2 (−1)P(y′) (α ′β ′∗+β ′α ′∗)
(−1)P(y) (β ′α ′∗+α ′β ′∗) (−1)P(y)+P(y′) (|β ′|2+ |α ′|2)
 .
This can be simplified on account of the normalization condition |α ′|2 + |β ′|2 = 1 and
(−1)P(y)+P(y′) = 1( mod 2) to:
ρFullPn =
 1 (−1)P(y′) 2ℜ(α ′β ′∗)
(−1)P(y) 2ℜ(α ′β ′∗) 1
 . (3.30)
Where ℜ(α ′β ′∗) denotes the real part of the expression.
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We trace over the share of Pn since we have no access to it on account of the n− 1
players trying to recover the secret state without Pn’s collaboration. In matrix form this
reduces to:
ρFullP\Pn =
1
2N
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
|y〉〈y′|⊗

(
1 0
)
ρFullPn
 1
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+
(
0 1
)
ρFullPn
 0
1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
1

=
1
N
N−1
∑
y=0
N−1
∑
y′=0
|y〉〈y′|. (3.31)
Therefore, we see that the density matrix of the (n−1) players is completely independent
of the secret state |Ψ〉.
Remark 3.53. We thus note that the Partial Encryption step saves the day since the
classical bits x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1 are uniformly distributed over all possible combinations
and thus being independent of all the other steps in the protocol, reveal nothing about x,
itself leaving Pn’s qubit in the totally mixed state. And thus the set P\Pn is left with a
uniform combination of all possible y ∈ {0,1}n−1.
Going back to remark 3.40 at the end of Section 3.2.2, on one hand, we mentioned
that all quantum secret sharing schemes were quantum error correction codes but that
the reverse was not necessary true. We gave an example of such a case (cf. Ex.3.41).
On the other hand, we also mentioned the possibility of overcoming such a limitation
i.e. transforming a quantum error correcting code that at first sight was not a perfect
quantum secret sharing schemes into one. The following corollary to remark 3.53 shows
how we can go about doing this:
Corollary 3.54. The [[4,1,2]]-QECC of Example 3.41 can be turned into a perfect
((3,4))-QTS provided we partially encrypt the state prior to encoding.
Proof. As in Example 3.41, let the state we want to encode be |ψ〉= α|0〉+β |1〉. After
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partial encryption we have the state |ψ〉 7→ |ψ ′〉= α ′|0〉+β ′|1〉 with
(
α ′,β ′
)
=

(α,β ) if x = 0,
(β ,α) if x = 1,
(3.32)
where the variable x was picked uniformly at random in {0,1} by the dealer D .
Since this encryption holds independently of any arbitrary unitary transformation the
collaborating unauthorized players decide to apply to their shares, it will prevent them
from getting any useful statistical information about α and/or β .
In order to recover the original state, the players proceed as in Example 3.41, while the
encryption variable x could be shared using a classical threshold scheme such as Shamir
or Blakley’s (c.f. Example 3.3 above).
In particular, in this example any set of two or less players would get no such statistical
information as is required by a perfect QSS. Therefore, only the intended authorized
sets will be able to recover the original state and we are left with a perfect ((3,4))-QSS
scheme.
3.4 Summary
In this core chapter, we presented the classical and quantum theories of secret shar-
ing schemes, emphasizing the most important properties, constructions and theorems
that are known in the literature. We also gave classical and quantum examples to sup-
port and solidify the theoretical ideas introduced throughout the text. The major lines of
the chapter consisted on linking quantum error correcting codes (presented in chapter 2)
with quantum secret sharing.
Our major contribution to QSS was the presentation of a perfect ((n,n)) quantum thresh-
old scheme with LOCC that minimized the number of quantum shares needed to recon-
struct the quantum secret state. We were able to reduce the number of quantum shares
to a single one per player putting our protocol within reach of an experimental imple-
mentation. The robustness of our resulting perfect scheme rested on the use of a partial
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quantum encryption step prior to the encoding of the secret state. This crucial step pre-
vented any leakage of statistical information about the secret state to unauthorized sets
of players. We used the same technique (c.f. Corollary 3.54) to show that it was possible
to convert a QECC code to a perfect QSS schemes which without the partial encryption
step was given in [24] as an example of the statement that “All quantum secret sharing
schemes are quantum error correcting codes but that the reverse is not necessary true”.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have seen throughout this thesis the interplay between quantum error corrections and
quantum secret sharing protocols, especially at the quantum level. Based on these obser-
vations, we presented in chapter 2 a glimpse at the theory of classical and quantum error
correction codes, while we discussed the theory of classical and quantum secret sharing
in chapter 3. One of our goals was to draw parallels between those two complementary
domains and in doing so we were able to present formal proofs of general theorems in
the theory of quantum secret sharing using first principles of the theory of quantum error
correction.
We have seen how the GHZ state gives rise to an elegant and efficient quantum secret
sharing protocol with purely classical communication during the reconstruction phase.
Because we have significantly lowered the quantum memory requirements, our protocol
may be within reach of experimental implementations. At the end of the chapter we
discussed as well the possibility of transforming quantum error correcting codes into
perfect quantum secret sharing schemes.
Throughout our discussion of secret sharing, we only focused on perfect schemes
(c.f. Definition 3.8) considering non perfect ones as being shortcomings of the protocols.
For example the ((n,n))-quantum secret threshold scheme based on teleportation [3] was
shown in [57] to leak information to non authorized sets of players and thus was non
secure. Once again partial encryption as discussed in our quantum protocol comes to
the rescue. It suffices to partially encrypt the secret quantum state prior to encoding to
turn the protocol into a perfect scheme. Apart from this security question, the efficiency
of this teleportation based protocol was questionable. It required n quantum shares per
player for a total of n2 qushares; while in our protocol we only needed a single quantum
share per participant for a total of n qushares [13], which as stated above is of great
practical interest. Here we coined the term qushare for quantum share.
Other interesting schemes that we did not discuss in this thesis consider sharing a
classical secret (as opposed to a quantum secret state) using quantum schemes (i.e. us-
ing quantum information to securely share a classical secret) [31, 39]. In [44] the authors
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tried to present a unified framework for quantum secret sharing using graph states [34]
by having simultaneously a secure and an efficient scheme (i.e. using only n qushares).
They partially succeed in their task. They were able to securely present a threshold
scheme in the case of sharing a classical secret, but when the secret to be shared was a
quantum state, their threshold scheme suffered from the same problem as the teleporta-
tion based protocol. They did not get a perfect threshold scheme and as a consequence
unauthorized sets were able to get relevant statistical information about the secret. They
pointed out this limitation in [45]. Thus, our protocol remains the only efficient and
secure ((n,n))-quantum threshold scheme with classical reconstruction phase.
Finally, we mention a very promising and interesting approach to quantum secret
sharing, which makes use of the theory of Matroids [51, 52] to link pure CSS-codes
(c.f. Section 2.2.1.1) to quantum secret sharing schemes. This approach appears to work
provided the secret being shared is classical [53–55], while it fails in the case of sharing
a quantum state. The main aim of this approach is to develop efficient quantum secret
sharing schemes given that classically, the most efficient schemes have been induced by
matroids.
Although a lot of work has been done in the theory of quantum secret sharing, there
are a few swampy roads relating the classical theory to its quantum counterpart (c.f.
Figure 3.3 below). Shedding light on those swamps might give us very interesting links
between matroids, graph states, CSS-codes and MSP-approaches in the context of Quan-
tum Information Theory.
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The figure below depicts the road from classical to quantum secret sharing. It shows
also the links between quantum error corrections and the theory of secret sharing. The
dotted (blue) arrows show that the quantum counterpart was built from the classical
concept in question. While the double headed arrows show the possibility of moving
from one domain to the other. The important question mark in the middle of the diagram
points to a very interesting open question: “Are Ideal schemes and matroids related to
Monotone Span Programs as applied to quantum secret sharing and if so what are the
more general consequence of such a correspondence?”
Figure 3.3: The Swampy Road.
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Appendix I
A Presto of Linear Algebra
In this appendix we review some basic facts in linear algebra that are used in the main
text. The material follows closely both [42] and [47].
Definition I.1. A linear transformation T : V → W (where V and W are vector spaces)
is a rule that assigns to each vector~v ∈V a unique vector T (~v) in W such that:
• (i) T (~u+~v) = T (~u)+T (~v), ∀~u,~v ∈V , and
• (ii) T (c~u) = c T (~u), ∀~u ∈V and c a scalar.
Definition I.2. The kernel (or null space) of a linear transformation T : V → W is the
set of all vectors~u such that T (~u) =~0, ~0 ∈ W.
Definition I.3. The range of a linear transformation T : V → W is the set of all vectors
~w ∈ W of the form T (~u) for some~u in V .
We now relate (n× n)-matrices to linear transformations: Consider a linear map
M : Cn → Cn and fix an arbitrary orthonormal basis {eˆk}. Let ~v = ∑nk=1 vkeˆk (i.e. we
represent the vector~v by its local coordinates with each vi ∈ C). Linearity of the map M
implies that M~v = ∑k vk Meˆk. Therefore the action of the map M on an arbitrary vector
is well determined provided its action on the basis vectors is given. Since (Meˆk) ∈ Cn,
we can expand it as
Meˆk =∑
j
eˆ j M jk. (I.1)
Taking the inner (or dot) product between Equation I.1 and eˆi we get:
eˆi ·Meˆk =∑
j
eˆi · eˆ j︸ ︷︷ ︸
δi j
M jk = Mik. (I.2)
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Equation I.2 describes the matrix element of M given an orthonormal basis {eˆk}.
Casting the above in terms of Dirac’s bra-ket notation:
Mik = 〈ei|M|ek〉. (I.3)
We thus get:
M =∑
i,k
Mik|ei〉〈ek|, (I.4)
which can easily be checked by multiplying M left and right by the completeness relation
I = ∑ni=1 |ei〉〈ei| as follow,
M = I M I =∑
i,k
|ei〉〈ei|M|ek〉〈ek|=∑
i,k
Mik|ei〉〈ek|. (I.5)
Definition I.4. A linear map M : Cn→ Cn is called a linear operator if
M(c1|x〉+ c2|y〉) = c1M|x〉+ c2M|y〉
holds for arbitrary |x〉,|y〉 ∈ Cn and ci ∈ C.
Definition I.5. The rank of a matrix A is the number of linearly independent columns
(or, equivalently, rows) and we write rank(A) to denote it.
Remark I.6. If the linear transformation T arises from a matrix transformation say
T (~x) = A~x for some matrix A and vector~x ∈ V , then
ker(T ) = Range(T ) = Null(A) =Col(A),
where Col(A) is the set of the columns of the matrix A.
iN .B. In this case, if A is an (m×n)-matrix we also have that
Null(A)+ rank(A) = n. (I.6)
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Definition I.7. Consider a set of vectors {~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vp} in V ; we write Span{~v1,~v2, · · · ,~vp}
for the set of all vectors that can be written as a linear combination of the {~vi}pi=1.
Definition I.8. A mapping T : Rn → Rm is said to be onto Rm if each vector~b ∈ Rm
is the image of at least one ~x ∈ Rn or equivalently ∀~b ∈ Rm there exists at least one
solution to T (~x) =~b.
Definition I.9. T is said to be 1 : 1 (one to one) if for each~b ∈ Rm, T (~x) =~b has either
a unique solution or none at all.
Theorem I.10. (Relation between fundamental subspaces of an (n×m)-matrix A)
Let A be an (n×m)-matrix. Then the orthogonal complement of the row space of A is
the null-space of A, and the orthogonal complement of the column space of A is the null
space of AT (where AT denotes the transpose of A and the row space of A (denoted by
Row(A)) is the set of all rows of the matrix A):
(Row(A))⊥ = Null(A) and (Col(A))⊥ = Null(AT ). (I.7)
This ends our brief exposition and reminder of some of the most pertinent concepts
of linear algebra in quantum information theory.
